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Bonn – and Europe – owe much to Franco-German ties



Fine words were spoken in plenty at the ceremony held in the Elysée Palace to commemorate the silver jubilee of the Franco-German friendship treaty.

President Mitterrand of France and Chancellor Kohl of Germany met in the French capital at the very spot where *President de Gaulle and Chancellor* Adenauer, the two grand old men of post-war Europe, signed the treaty 25 years ago.

Both needed it at the time, and to this day Paris and Bonn insist that the treaty is the cornerstone of their policies.

M. Mitterrand called for "further progress," whereas Bonn has not always been in such a hurry in recent years, having seldom set the pace of European integration of late.

Even so, we may yet have reason to be grateful to the French for the Gallic impatience and, at times, Gallic obstinacy with which they have refused to allow *us to rest on our laurels.*

Bonn's imperturbability is understandable. The Germans have never had *it so good. Over* the past quarter-century West Germany has become an economic superpower.

The world — and not just Europe — is its market and the deutschemark has emerged as a leading international currency.

The Atlantic alliance continues to ensure our security, yet nowadays there are opportunities for dialogue and cooperation with the East that seemed inconceivable only a few years ago.

France in contrast is hard-pressed. A proud country, it has come up against limits to its power. France's economic potential has long trailed its political aspirations. Its military might is on the decline.

The French today realise they are dependent on the Federal Republic economically and on the United States for *their security. The concept of "decline"* is going the rounds in Paris *salons.*

France, unlike its self-satisfied West German neighbour, does not feel at all well in its present position.

This is very much to the benefit of Europe and the Federal Republic. France used to seek a solution to its problems by a policy of national entrenchment; it is now keen to throw in its lot with Western Europe.

In security policy we owe to the French the fact that a greater European say in the Western alliance continues to be on the agenda. François Mitterrand in particular has sacrificed an entire herd of holy cows in this connection.

The erstwhile sanctuary doctrine, based on the assumption that France could stand aloof in the event of a European conflict, is now generally acknowledged to be utterly mistaken.

President Mitterrand and Prime Minister Chirac now openly affirm the commitment France undertook over 30 years ago in the Brussels Treaty but Pa*ris long preferred not to mention: that* "France would commit itself immediately and totally if the Federal Republic were the victim of an act of aggression."


President Mitterrand is prepared to consult the Bonn government on the use of French nuclear weapons "on German soil," time permitting.

Last year units of the French *Forces d'action rapide,* or rapid deployment force, held their first joint manoeuvres with Bundeswehr units on the south-eastern border of the Fed*eral Republic. Paris* agreed without lengthy hesitation to Bonn's proposal to set up a joint Franco-German brigade and a joint defence council with a standing secretariat. No French government is likely, in the foreseeable future, to place French forces under Nato supreme command — as they were until 1966 — but Paris is plainly resolved not to allow this to become the overriding obstacle to cooperation. Second, we owe *it to the French that Europe has* not left non-military space research and development entirely to Japan and the world powers.

The West now has a viable non-military space launcher vehicle. It does so by virtue of France's Ariane programme, which the Germans initially joined most half-heartedly.

We took our time before agreeing to take part in the Hermes space shuttle project.

And even though politicians of such *varying political persuasions as Hans-*Dietrich Genscher and Alfred Dregger are still hopefully fighting a rearguard action, Bonn has totally ruled out the ambitious proposal for a joint observation satellite to free Europe from its dependence on the US information monopoly.


President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl poring over the latest Franco-German accords in Paris. (Photo: AP)

Third, we owe it to France that a common monetary policy debate is still *under way in the European Community.*

The idea isn't new. Helmut Schmidt and Valéry Giscard d'Estaing thought up in 1978 the European Monetary System, which has since kept fluctuations in European exchange rates within tolerable bounds.

Like Herr Schmidt, the French always wanted to go further and set up a common European currency.

If they have made no headway on this point, then mainly on account of the German Bundesbank, which has *defended tooth and nail its autonomy* on monetary issues and is not even prepared to include the franc in its foreign exchange reserves.

The political integration of Western Europe can hardly be expected to make headway as long as the Federal Republic, the Continent's key financial power, fails to demonstrate in the monetary sector the solidarity it expects of France in other sectors.

The economic and financial council President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl agreed in Paris to set up will only make sense if Bonn and the Bundesbank have learnt a lesson or two.

Will French urging and Parisian dissatisfaction continue to give European integration a fillip? That is surely the crucial question on the 25th anniversary *of the Franco-German friendship* treaty.

The answer is partly up to Bonn. The French might one day tire of German foot-dragging and interpret it as a desire on the Federal Republic's part not to commit itself too heavily to the West.

The French are, in any case, only too inclined to suspect every move Bonn makes in Ostpolitik as a covert desire to

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Genscher in Israel as 'time runs short' in Middle East



Foreign Minister Genscher, in conferring with leading Israeli politicians, briefed them on his talks with President Assad of Syria and President Mubarak of Egypt.

In all Arab capitals Herr Genscher has been told that only an international conference on the Middle East can bring about a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians.

Foreign Minister Peres of Israel gave Herr Genscher a hearing on this point. Other Israeli politicians are opposed to the idea.

Prime Minister Shamir and the Likud bloc would prefer separate arrangements along Camp David lines, but they are clearly out of the question.

*The Arab League is intent on an in*ternational framework. So is Europe, while even the Americans are increasingly keen on the idea of an international "umbrella."

Time is short, with renewed riots in East Jerusalem, thousands of West Bank Arabs demonstrating in Nazareth and the largest Jewish peace rally in years being held in Tel Aviv.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 25 January 1988)

■ EAST-WEST TIES

Shevardnadze in Bonn disappoints on Berlin and disarmament

Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's Bonn visit was a disappointment. He came across as a cool politician who knows how to fudge issues with fine words. His smooth formulations awakened the hope that Moscow might make concessions on Berlin. But that did not happen.

He indicated something like a third zero option for short-range missiles and later made it quite clear that this was not really meant at all.

He reached agreement fastest with German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher on support for a ban on chemical weapons. One novelty was the Russian's comment, which was picked up by Genscher, that it was time for a gradual overcoming of the division of Europe.

The ministers also discussed economic matters. Though neither side was clear on how they would protect and promote future investments.

It was quite obvious that both sides wanted to improve cooperation in all areas. And in this respect both Bonn and Moscow can look upon the visit as a success.

However Bonn was disappointed with talks about improving the status of Berlin. President von Weizsäcker told Mr Shevardnadze he would like to see Berlin having an unrestricted share in the improved relations between Bonn and Moscow. Mr Shevardnadze said everything was permissible which was not ruled out by the 1971 Four-Power Agreement.

Weizäcker understood this as a basically positive statement. But when the overdue Russo-German agreement was discussed later in the Foreign Office, it turned out that not the slightest rapprochement had been made. Moscow is not even prepared to proceed with negotiations on an agreement on scientific and technological cooperation along the lines of a 1986 framework agreement.

The framework agreement is an agreement on fundamental priciples which can later be developed into a fully fledged treaty. The 1986 agreement related to nuclear energy, health care and the environment. Bonn and Moscow also have two shelved ones on the arts and legal assistance from the 70s, stymied by disagreement on the status of Berlin.

In 1986 Bonn government officials thought the framework agreement would include the participation of West Berlin and of Berlin officials.

The Germans listed members of Federal institutions in Berlin in the nuclear and health care programme.

The institute remained anonymous behind a postbox number. The Russians did not like this at all.

At the same time both sides wanted to see movement on an environmental agreement. Bonn included an official from the Berlin-based Federal Environmental Protection Agency in the list of people who would participate in talks.

But the Berlin factor stalled the environment agreement much like it stalled framework agreements on the arts and legal assistance signed in the 70s. The agreement on legal assistance ran into problems because Bonn expected to see West Berlin incorporated into it.

The Russians are insisting on an odd regulation before talks on the environment can make headway. They want to



make a clear distinction between officials from the Federal Republic and from Berlin by listing the latter last.

This would mean listing an official from the West although the alphabetical order would give preference to a Berlin one.

But as far as Bonn was concerned this would have meant the unacceptable recognition of a political distinction between West Germany and West Berlin. Bonn accused Moscow of backtracking on the 1986 fundamental framework agreement.

Mr Shevardnadze did not agree that the Soviet Union was trying to go back to a pre-1986 situation. He said it had been his intention all along to have a separate alphabetical system for Berlin. But under the pressure of having to sign within 10 minutes there had been a "mistake." He said he had stated his views beforehand and that people should not be surprised about his position.

Apart from that, it now seems as if the Soviets are refusing to cooperate on an arts project in Berlin. Even the realisation of the two-year arts programme, which is essential for the realisation of the cultural agreement, has run aground. Moscow says that it cannot accept artists and singers from West Berlin as being the same as enterprises from the Federal Republic.

Bonn's answer is that the participation of West Berlin artists is provided for in the cultural agreement.

These are not the only agreements which have come to nothing. The Germans have had to put on ice an agreement on navigation for ships from Berlin. Although there are not many, Bonn refused to accept that Berlin ships should sail under the Berlin flag and not under the Federal Republic's ensign.

On the other hand there have been successful negotiations on an inland navigation agreement. It should be signed after the Danube treaty in Belgrade.

During his visit, the Soviet Foreign Minister raised the subject of atomic weapons. He said he wanted to see the abolition of nuclear weapons which have selected targets.

He did not use the term "zero option" for short-range missiles. Instead he used the term to describe something more far-reaching. But he did not explain how this would be achieved.

The West's understanding of a third zero option is the abolition of short-range nuclear missiles with a range of under 500 kilometres.

Mr Shevardnadze's concept is more comprehensive. He includes tactical aircraft and atomic artillery as well as missiles stationed in Europe.

He said that American and Russian atomic weapons were all pointed at countries which were near the line of contact between both military blocs.

Mr Shevardnadze said: "We are pleading for the complete abolition of tactical nuclear weapons, something which would correspond to Europe's very own interests."

The Bonn Foreign Office sees in this concept a recourse to Mr Gorbachov's target of the elimination of all atomic weapons and Mr Reagan's vision of a world free of atomic weapons.

However, Mr Shevardnadze later qualified his proposals to some extent. Of course, he said, "a solution like this is only possible with the participation of the other nuclear powers, and it is not our fault that they are not yet ready to take part."

The Germans regarded this as a reference to Britain and France. They do not entertain the removal of such weapons at all. As a result, Moscow's invitation looks somewhat unrealistic.

Mr Shevardnadze said: "We could at least begin discussing in future negotiations the reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons which can be used also for nuclear purposes."

Herr Genscher and his team of specialists think the Russians want the Vienna mandate for talks on conventional and atomic weapons to include multi-functional artillery and aircraft as well. But the Russians are being deliberately fuzzy on the details.

If it's really necessary, the West could take into consideration the regional incorporation of aircraft and artillery with nuclear potential in a verified global agreement.

But it looks like as if the Russians do not want a zero option on aircraft and artillery either. They prefer to get reductions in armaments through conventional channels.

But Mr Shevardnadze has confirmed the Soviet Union's intention of achieving a nuclear free Europe. A de-nuclearised Europe would for the time being give the Russians military dominance on account of their superiority in conventional weapons. This scenario is something which has aroused fears in certain circles.

And what is Herr Genscher's attitude? He has noticed an isolationist trend among certain American strategists.

So he is placing a lot of importance on harmonious relations with France. At the meeting with Mr Shevardnadze, Herr Genscher could not praise M. Mitterrand enough.

Bonn is not bubbling over with satisfaction at the Soviet Union's ubiquitously expressed desire for consolidated cooperation. It would not do either Bonn or Moscow any harm, if from now on, relations were more business-like. Even if such steps prove to be laborious.

Claus Gennrich

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 20 January 1988)

East Berlin arrests cast shadow on Bonn-Moscow relations

East German authorities arrested demonstrators protesting at an official commemorative march in honour of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, communists who were murdered by German soldiers in Berlin in 1919.

The demonstrators were protesting against infringements on personal freedom such as state restrictions on travel and emigration.

The arrests managed to cast a shadow over the visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Edward Shevardnadze to Bonn. Before he arrived he had spoken of "great plans," and the "good international background." Events in Berlin made his words sound a bit empty.

East German leaders fear nothing more than radical changes in the political system. Kurt Hager, head of ideology at the SED, put that on the record last April. The SED is the East German Socialist Unity Party. The arrests were a clear reminder of this to both the Russians and the West Germans.

Ironically, in September, groups working under the auspices of the Protestant Church were allowed to demonstrate at the Olaf Palme peace march. The demonstrators' placards carried their own slogans, which were far more explosive than the quotation the arrested demonstrators carried of Rosa Luxemburg's famous quotation: "Freedom is always the freedom of others to think differently."

But the Palme march took place shortly before the historic visit of East German leader Erich Honecker to West Germany. And it enabled Honecker to play the role of the tolerant politician in Bonn.

Last August, the SPD's commission on basic values and the SED Central Committee's Academy of Social Sciences signed a paper entitled: "The Conflict of Ideologies and Joint Security." The document deals with, among other things, the culture of political conflict.

The document recognises the growing importance of dialogue wiht all social forces and individuals. But the latest arrests have shown once again that it's precisely such a dialogue which is causing the SED most of its problems.

At the commemorative ceremony for Luxemburg and Liebknecht, Egon Krenz, the SED politburo member in charge of security, said that what really counts is Luxemburg and Liebknecht's warning that, "war and danger of war have their roots in capitalism."

Admittedly history can contradict such wisdom with the example of the war between Communist China and Vietnam. But Krenz still says: "The need of the hour is still universal vigilance."

But the SED's security apparatus is not just concerned with the vigilance motive. It also wants to remind citizens

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
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■ HOME AFFAIRS

Kohl's optimism continues in face of difficulties

Chancellor Helmut Kohl is a cheerful soul. But now and then he shows an optimism that is so exaggerated that one involuntarily thinks of children in a dark cellar singing to drive away their fears.

This is how it appeared at the Chancellor's recent press conference in Bonn. It is true that his coalition government is not standing up to its neck in troubled waters. But it is not telling a lie to say that the partners are showing increasing irritation and occasionally give the impression that they would soon be going to a divorce lawyer.

Chancellor Kohl cannot dispute that the Bonn government has sailed into troubled waters.

The excessive profusion of the problems of the ailing budget (more public borrowing, tax reform, unemployment, the steel industry crisis, higher contributions to the European Community, soaring health costs and pensions reform) are ruining the nerves of politicians involved in these matters.

To this can be added the crisis of confidence after the Uwe Barschel affair and the Transnuklear scandal, for which indeed the Bonn government is not responsible, but which it cannot duck.

No politician has a charm that can make these trials disappear over night. And it seems none of the parties have an answer either.

Kohl has tried, however, to make his position clear on one point. Every grumbler in the FDP and CDU/CSU who has found fault with Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg, at the beginning very thifty, now knows that the Chancellor himself pressured his Finance Minister into taking the measures they grumble about.

These measures extend from more public borrowing, possibly essential increases in consumer taxes to putting his reputation of being a Finance Minister who balances the budget on the block without a thought.

Anyone who takes a swipe at Stoltenberg in the future, hurts the Chancellor.

Helmut Kohl, who until now has preferred playing the role of generous team leader, has unmistakenly insisted on his right to be the policy-maker. Kohl has upped not only his commitment but also his risks.

Leading this coalition is indeed not child's play. It suffers from the unquenched ambitions of so notorious a know-all as Franz Josef Strauss, and Count Otto Lambsdorff (former Economic Affairs Minister) uses every opportunity to put his vanity before joint policies.

Strauss, for example has for years waged a private war against Foreign Affairs Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher. Strauss maintains he has not repesented German interests forcefully enough in the East Bloc.

Now, since Strauss has been allowed to enter the holy of holys of the communists, everything almost seems suddenly to have changed.

But more important than this emotional jealousy is the fact that, quite unlike the time when the FDP and SPD fished in differing waters, CDU/CSU and the FDP are casting their lines together on the banks of the middle-class pond.

There they are looking frantically for bait, as with the case of the "Vermummungsverbot," legislation making it illegal for protestors to cover their faces, bait that will make voters bite.

After all the FDP has profited until now from this contest. They are now represented in all state parliaments with the exception of the Bavarian Parliament.

On the other hand a series of lacklustre election campaigns have led to a noticeable nervousness among the CDU/CSU and there has been an increase in animosity towards the FDP.

In the first six months of this year there are to be two state elections, into which the CDU is going with apprehension and the FDP full of confidence.

Both elections promise to be exciting. In Baden-Württemberg the CDU has to defend an absolute majority. If the CDU holds its ground then the cards will be re-shuffled for the game, supposedly already decide, in Schleswig-Holstein.

Schleswig-Holstein has never been SPD territory. SPD leader there, Björn Engholm, cannot be so sure of things as they seem to be at present. In four months' time the wind can change considerably.

If things should turn out as in Hamburg and a workable majority could only be achieved by a coalition between the SPD and the FDP, the CDU should not go off into a corner and sulk. It would not be the end of the world if there was not a conservative-liberal government in Schleswig-Holstein.

Coalitions are forced alliance that usually hold together so long as interests are mutual. It cannot be shown that the Bonn coalition has yet burnt itself out.

If the FDP wanted to swing back to the SPD, they must be able to explain to their voters that they can no longer agree important political decisions with the CDU.

There is no sign of this. There will be some grinding of teeth in Bonn in the future, but there is no sign, yet, that the coalition is endangered.

Ludwig Harms

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 15 January 1988)

Decisions on money and on ministers

Undoubtedly Helmut Kohl has the gift of working himself up into a optimistic view of matters when things get difficult — and then is totally unable to understand if his listeners remain sceptical.

The Chancellor demonstrated his gift at his first press conference this year in Bonn, when he commented on the country's financial position and the increased public borrowing that will be necessary for 1988.

To the unpleasant truth of the dual decision of last week — ten billion marks more public borrowing planned for this year with the promise to economise again in 1989 — was added the hope of better times to come.

What will remain of these announcements and promises in twelve months' time is anyone's guess.

Kohl wants to demonstrate to the public strong leadership. For this reason he repeated that the cabinet decisions were precipitated by unadorned pressure from him.

He presented himself in the role of a reflective, cautious head of government, who did not put too much weight on bad news.

Thus his comment that the economic data could be more favourable when it comes to working out the supplementary budget early in the summer.

Certainly it makes sense not to make the horse any more shy than it is. But there are too many expert forecasts that do not support such expectations.

There is a familiar ring to Kohl's remarks such as: "The situation has come upon us," and, "The hallmark of this government is that we shall incur no debts."

The Chancellor did make a reference to the Finance Minister's future. He said that it was not his way of doing things to let his friends and colleagues down. He said that he would stamp on any attempts to sack a cabinet minister.

In May a decision must be taken as to whom will follow Manfred Wörner (moving to be the head of Nato) as Defence Minister. Kohl would not give any details.

He said that with the best will in the world he could not say now whether other changes in the cabinet would then take place or not.

The Chancellor was standing on firmer ground when he came to deal with foreign affairs. Many internal and economic policy difficulties will be overlaid, so he hopes, by the proposed visit of the Soviet Leader, Mikhail Gorbachev.

Helmut Kohl reckons on a brilliant renaissance of Soviet-German relations and, as a consequence of that, a general uplift to German *Ostpolitik*.

This expectation could be fulfilled; for the general tendency of East-West relations favours a new, active German approach to *Ostpolitik*, which the opposition has been demanding for some time, which Foreign Minister Genscher undertook some months ago and which the Chancellor now, wholeheartedly, supports — after Franz Josef Strauss cleared the way.

As regards European policies Bonn will have a difficult time during the German presidency of the European Community.

In his first press conference of 1988 Kohl made realistic assessments about Europe and warned against exaggerated expectations.

Martin E. Süskind

(Süddeutsche Zeitung, 12 January 1988)

New arguments in wake of INF treaty

Anyone who believed that with the signing of the INF Treaty in Washington on 8 December 1987 that "medium-range missile peace" had broken out in the Federal Republic was sadly disappointed.

Politicians of all parties still see as a thorn in the flesh the fact that we have had inflicted on us a range limit of up to 500 kilometres.

It can still be clearly heard from both "camps" that German territory is now to be abandoned to a special threat. We are to be pushed into a zone of unequal security.

Short-range missiles, in the main, threaten German territory on both sides of the European dividing line and to a severe extent. The imbalance in short-range nuclear forces (SFN) is in fact in the ratio of 1 to 15.

The Federal Republic government, with considerable opposition support, obliged its Alliance partners at the Reykjavik Council of Ministers meeting last June to agree that after the INF Treaty the SNF question would be integrated into the conventional weapons question in the next negotiations. This was stated in paragraph 8 of the communiqué.

A timetable for steps towards disarmament was not laid down in Reykjavik.

So what had to happen happened. The Alliance has split. Fifteen Nato nations are now inclined towards the view that there should be an end to further nuclear reductions so that more attention can be given to the imbalance of conventional forces in Europe.

The Federal Republic is alone in opposing this among Nato members. We reject a sequence of events that concentrates firstly on conventional and then on short-range nuclear weapons.

At a conference in the Friedrich Ebert Foundation General Wolfgang Altenburg, the German chairman of Nato's "Military Committee," hinted that he felt obliged to take up the German position.

But the General also recalled the sovereign governments of the [illegible] states with other opinions — a cautious hint that it was futile to bang the German head here against the Nato wall.

At the moment the Germans are completely self-willed because in this area particularly the most powerful fruits of friendship between the two major parties in this country, the CSU/CDU and SPD, began to develop.

There was no dissent at the Friedrich Ebert Foundation conference (attended by people of all political colourings) when Egon Bahr and Horst Ehmke argued that it made no sense to neglect this area, of all places, where the most glaring imbalances existed (that is in short-range nuclear force weapons) and begin with the less important disparity in conventional weapons.

Within Nato the arguments are carried on at various levels. Even if the German position is plausible, there is no agreement. Our friends are anxious above all things that the next round of negotiations will inevitably tend towards a "null" solution — a development that no-one wants.

But how can the Germans guarantee that the pull in this direction is controlled, and not by balanced Soviet conventional might in Europe?

That would be an outright (involuntary) act of self-surrender by the West.

It follows that nothing is gained for German policy using its weighty trump card — the Federal Republic being in the centre of the Continent — with all parties in the country singing together a song of self-pity and getting on Nato's nerves. We should not waste the capital we now have on unachievable goals.


Anyway we have other questions to think about, questions such as the future configuration of Nato forces and their strategy.

In the meantime it does us good that approximately 500,000 Nato soldiers in the country are threatened just as we are.

If their governments expect them to endure the new threatr, then this situation is a) presented as an exaggered threat, and b) our argument of being "the only people involved" is very paltry.

Thomas Kielinger

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 15 January 1988)



■ PARTY POLITICS

Stoltenberg under unaccustomed cloud of mounting problems in Bonn

RHEINISCHER MERKUR

Gerhard Stoltenberg's admission to the press in Bonn, that he has failed to meet his spending cut targets, is a symbol of personal humilation.

The hard man of the Christian liberal coalition has lost his lustre. The opinion polls show the former star of Kohl's cabinet was the loser of 1987. Since 1986 he lead the popularity stakes unchallenged but is now down to position ten.

Admittedly, the opinion surveys are not absolutely accurate reflections of political circumstances. They basically only reflect the current trends.

If anybody is aware of the truth of this, then it's Hans Dietrich Genscher, the Foreign Minister and Chairman of the FDP. After the liberals left the coalition with the Social Democrats in 1982 to join up with the conservatives, many saw him as the personification of treachery who even left his own supporters in the lurch. But now he is highly thought of again.

But it's unlikely that Stoltenberg will gather much comfort from that. The reality is the public is sceptical or even dismissive of his tax reform plans.

Instead of reducing the national debt as he promised, he has to inflate it by DM40bn and Stoltenberg himself sees this as a personal failure.

But that is nothing compared to what the Barschel Affair in Kiel did to his standing. Barschel, the late Prime Minister of Schleswig-Holstein, committed suicide in a Swiss hotel after being accused of involvement in a dirty tricks campaign against the SPD. Stoltenberg was unable to avoid being drawn into the scandal.

Stoltenberg now has to worry about his political reputation. The late Kurt Becker, Helmut Schmidt's former spokesman, said Stoltenberg was "the embodiment of thoroughness and efficiency, a man of integrity who has never even been on the fringe of a scandal."

Even the Social Democratic paper *Vorwärts* had to enviously admit Stoltenberg was as popular as "cream-toffee."

The SPD also had to admit that they had no answer to the "Helmut Schmidt without the schnozzle," who gave citizens the feeling they could sleep calmly under his management.

With a reputation like that it was unavoidable that Gerhard Stoltenberg would be talked of as the man who would succeed Helmut Kohl if he ever fell from grace.

Up to recently, the positive image of the frugal family-man concealed political weaknesses.

After the new coalition was formed, for example, Stoltenberg tried to introduce a compulsory tax on high earners. The government raked in about DM2.5bn in tax to finance new investments.

The money was supposed to be paid back later at a fixed date. Stoltenberg said: "We will pay back the loan, as agreed in the coalition, within the prescribed period."

The new coalition won the general election some months later. And despite what he had said, Stoltenberg agreed a few months later to a decision of the CDU's national executive not to give the money back.

Shortly afterwards insult was added to injury when the constitutional court in 1984 declared the tax unconstitutional.

Another case of Stoltenberg's indecisiveness was his announcement in March 1985 to drastically reduce the government's share in 11 economic enterprises.

Admittedly the Veba Group was privatised. But a year later there were still five of them left.

One could say the handling of Lufthansa was almost treacherous. The firm also stood on the selling list until Franz Josef Strauss, who is a member of the board of trustees, put a stop to it. And instead of fighting for his concept Stoltenberg gave in. This lack of fighting spirit and consistency has been visible more than once. When he was in opposition, along with his party, he aggressively inveighed against the social-liberal coalition's decision to let Bundesbank profits flow into its purse.

Stoltenberg was hardly in power himself, when he also used the same means to reduce the national debt.

Whoever sees the Bundesbank profits as a *legal instrument for balancing budgets*, should conversely not be surprised at the problems caused if the dollar's *plunge wipes out profits*.

The Finance Minister's image will suffer even more when he probably introduces unpopular taxes next year on tobacco and alcohol.

Gerhard Stoltenberg was in any case by no means always so tight on spending as he would like to have believed.

In the Summer of 1984, before the Schleswig-Holstein municipal elections, he was badgered by farmers in his home constituency of Rendsburg. Up to then he had been talking of cutting back on subsidies. But instead he made available more than DM20bn for agriculture. This gesture showed that he was no longer prepared to stick to what he said.

The "cool" northerner has been deeply hurt by recent events. Even if he does not let it show. He is now 59 years old. Apart from a short interruption, he has spent 20 years among the elite of German politics.

But at no stage did he ever have to go through such a personal and political test like the current Barschel affair. It has been a really terrible time for him, which he never wants to experience again.

The Finance Minister is not the kind of person who has friends or pals. He never took part in backroom discussions or intimate strategies with the party to reach political decisions or to help his career. Instead he waited for posts to be handed to him on a silver plate.

For many years he was always the youngest. At 26 years of age, the vicar's son from Kiel entered the Schleswig-Holstein parliament as national chairman of the Christian Democratic youth.

When he was 29 years-old he *switched to the parliament* in Bonn. At 37 he worked under Ludwig Erhard and later in Kurt Georg Kiesinger's "Grand Coalition" as Research Minister. He was 43 years old when the Schleswig-



Gerhard Stoltenberg

(Photo: Sven Simon)

Holstein CDU called him back to head the *Land* government there.

His authority in the Kiel cabinet was so great, scoffers asked whether it was true the cabinet actually had other ministers. They were told that in principle it had.

With a reputation and background like that, it was only logical that Helmut Kohl would make him his treasurer. Now for the first time the picture book career has a few stains. People are beginning to have doubts about him.

Helmut Kohl will definately continue to support him. After all it was Kohl's preliminary work which helped Gerhard Stoltenberg to get an excellent election result at the party's last politcal conference.

However his authority is now in the hands of the Federal Chancellor. And he has not been known to *complain* when his competitors have been plagued by political faintness.

Gisbert Kuhn

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 15 January 1988)

Hoffmann takes on tough task in Schleswig-Holstein

Heiko Hoffmann has accepted the candidacy of the CDU in the coming *Land* election in Schleswig-Holstein. Surely one of the most thankless tasks the party has to offer.

After the Barschel/Pfeiffer scandal, the party is going to have a hard time selling itself to voters. Barschel, the late Prime Minister of Schleswig-Holstein, was found dead in a Swiss hotel after being accused by CDU worker Pfeiffer, of involvement in a dirty tricks campaign against the SPD.

Hoffmann, a 52-year-old lawyer from Stettin in East Germany, did not exactly volunteer for the election on 8 May.

But his nomination at a CDU committee meeting, at which he beat his rival Henning Schwarz, will bring relief and encouragement to a demoralised CDU in Kiel.

Hoffmann reflected for a long time whether he would stand against Schwarz the caretaker Prime Minister, and Stoltenberg the party chairman. But the party had lost faith in Schwarz after the Barschel affair. Party members wanted to see a new beginning. During a Christmas visit to his sister in East Germany, he finally made the decision to run.

The social conditions of post-war So-



Heiko Hoffmann

(Photo: dpa)

viet-occupied Germany made a big impression on him.

As a member of the Young Protestant Congregation, he saw at school in Gernrode and in Quedlinburg how a totalitarian state raises people to hate and to spy on people.

He made no secret of his rejection of the system. The authorities suspended him from secondary school.

He fled a few months after the workers' revolt on 17 June in East Berlin he fled via West Berlin to Hesse. His first experiences in a grammar school in Limburg were depressing. His fellow students had little understanding for what he had gone through.

He became a member of the young Christian Democrats while still at school. His idols were Bishop Otto Dibelius from Berlin, Konrad Adenauer and Jakob Kaiser.

He went on to study law, politics and philosophy in Frankfurt and Marburg. He became a member of the Christian democrats student organisation.

He took his law exam in Hamburg and joined the civil service in Schleswig-Holstein. Hoffmann settled in Bad Schwartau in front of the famous gates of Lübeck. He made a name for himself in the CDU and in 1973 became a member of the *Land* parliament.

Five years later the senior government official at the Ministry of Culture, Education and Church Affairs, succeeded Uwe Barschel as house leader. In 1985 Hoffmann became Justice Minister.

He has managed to keep his private life from the media. He likes to read history and political literature in the little leisure time that he has available.

He likes to bring his camera with him on holidays. He also likes to cook for the family sometimes. His son Thorsten is 16 years old.

Diethart Goos

(Die Welt, Hamburg, 16 January 1988)

■ PERSPECTIVE

After 25 years, the Franco-German pas de deux becomes a quickstep

Werner Weidenfeld, who wrote this article for *Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt*, is professor of Political Science at Mainz University. He is also coordinator of German-American cooperation.

France and Germany are stepping up their cooperation in a whole range of fields: activities ranges from the setting up of a joint security policy council and a joint university college to the joint training of officers and attempts at greater economic and monetary policy coordination.

A glance at the list of official engagements of both French and West German members of government maps out the itinerary of closer relations.

Franco-German cooperation has developed in such a dynamic way during recent years that words of warning can already be heard in other countries.

Francois Mitterrand and Helmut Kohl have announced further initiatives.

During such phases of bi-national forward movement it is well worth reappraising the historical dimensions of its thrust and objectives.

The 25th anniversary of the signing of the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation provides a meaningful opportunity to take stock of the development of Franco-German relations.

How is the current state of these relations and their future prospects to be rated in terms of the original intentions of the Treaty's authors?

If Konrad Adenauer and Charles de Gaulle were alive today, they would be extremely surprised or at least irritated by many of the anniversary commentaries and ceremonial words of praise.

In the attempt to find a friendly and harmonious explanation of the decisions taken 25 years ago these two born fighters lose their specific profiles and idiosyncratic distinction.

The well-meaning transfiguration of the events which led up to the signing of the Treaty makes both Adenauer and de Gaulle look much smoother than they actually were.

What is needed, therefore, is a rectification on the basis of existing *source material* of the reduced explanation of the meaning and purpose of the Franco-German Treaty.

In academic literature on this subject the document signed on 22 January, *1963*, is sometimes described as "a superfluous agreement" or even as "a stillborn child".

Why, many ask, was it necessary to seal Franco-German *rapprochement* in the form of a treaty if, which is much more significant, it had already long since taken place?

Both countries had joined forces in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Economic Community (Common Market) and Euratom.

The awkward problem of Saarland's return to Germany had been solved.

Both countries emphatically rejected the Soviet ultimatum to the Western Powers demanding the withdrawal of Allied Powers and the conversion of Berlin into a demilitarised and free city in 1958.

By doing so they prompted the USA and Britain to adopt a more determined stance.

The Berlin crisis was a crucial political experience for the relationship between Konrad Adenaer and Charles de Gaulle.

The scepticism towards the political will of the USA and Britain to show solidarity through thick and thin must be viewed against this background.

But why was a special treaty needed to reinforce ties between France and the Federal Republic of Germany?

The period in which the treaty was born was marked by considerable international and domestic policy tension.

The Berlin ultimatum in 1958 and the subsequent Berlin crisis, the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961, the failure of the European Political Union in 1962, the French veto against Britain's membership in the Common Market in 1962/63 and the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 are just some of the critical events which took place at that time.

In addition, there were security policy irritations within Nato due to a growing mistrust that the superpowers might come to some arrangement at the expense of their Allies in the wake of the Cuba crisis.

De Gaulle was faced by problems at home and Adenauer was gradually losing power in view of the approaching end of his political era already agreed on in the Bonn coalition. Adenauer himself would have liked to have postponed his departure a little further.

Despite these "difficulties" both statesmen made feverish efforts to get their treaty signed and sealed.

Such a political situation triggers the mistrust of other countries, which feel that a treaty might be wielded against their interests.

The Soviets perceived a gloomy element of revanchism.

Washington and London reacted to the treaty with unusually deep resentment.

European Community partners feared a plan for Franco-German hegemony.

The then president of the Community's Commission, Walter Hallstein, chose an unusual way in which to express his criticism.

In a memorable speech to the European Parliament on 27 March, 1963, he castigated the treaty as a threat to integration.

This led to some bitter correspondence between the two European brothers-in-arms, Adenauer and Hallstein.

Adenauer was incensed and accused Hallstein of a breach of loyalty.

There was also conflict between Adenauer and the Bundestag parliamentary parties.

In the end, the Bundestag added a preamble to the treaty which could only be understood as a snub against the French.

To describe the treaty's objectives as the strengthening of European integration including the incorporation of Britain, the intensification of European-American relations and the reinforcement of the Atlantic Alliance could only be the result of a mixture of irony and cynicism.

De Gaulle expressed his disappointment to Carlo Schmid as follows: "The Treaty is dead before it even comes into force".

The signing of the Treaty could by no means be taken as a matter of course.

Despite the obvious insult by the German partner de Gaulle nevertheless suggested a further-reaching Franco-German political union to Adenauer's successor as Chancellor in Bonn, Ludwig Erhard.

Erhard answered tersely: "Let us return to business as usual".

The period following the signing of the treaty was marked by disinterest and disappointments.

In order to comprehend the real meaning of the treaty and rediscover it significance beneath the mildew of misunderstandings, unsuspecting indifferences and prejudices it is important to take a closer look at the situation in which the treaty was elaborated and the intentions of the treaty's authors.

The exact hour of the treaty's "birth" was 10 a.m. on 4 July, 1962.

Adenauer and de Gaulle met for a private tète-à-tète which lasted eighty minutes.

This was the second meeting between the two politicians during the Bonn Chancellor's visit to France.

The symbolic climax to the visit was the mass in the cathedral of Reims, the coronation church of the French kings.

The first meeting between the two politicians on 3 July centred exclusively on the urgent need for a European "Political Union".

Both Adenauer and de Gaulle feared that the Fouchet plans might fail and both expressed their scepticism about Britain's desire for political unification.

They emphasised that Western Europe must be politically able to speak with one voice.

Both politicians took up these ideas again on 4 July and added a security policy variant: the threat by Moscow and the attempts by the Soviet Union to play off the Western Europeans against each other.

Doubts were cast upon Nato's ability to act.

Adenauer's conclusion was that if the political union of Western Europe is not



yet possible, the threat of Soviet communism continues, and Nato only able to develop a limited capability to act in the European context, a Franco-German entente, which could initially begin as a loose "consultative arrangement", is essential.

De Gaulle tentatively asked Adenauer for details of such an arrangement.

Attention turned to a closer form of security policy cooperation in Western Europe.

This could be initiated, said Adenauer, by France and the Federal Republic of Germany and then extended to include all the six members of the European Economic Community.

Both politicians seemed so fascinated by the idea that they spontaneously agreed on an additional private meeting the next day.

In a fascinating and almost dramatic dialogue they decided to discuss the idea in greater detail.

These two grand old men were seeking to make their final mark on their political era, even though they were running out of time and surrounded by people who were already preparing for the next era.

As they were both born fighters they id what they could do best and carried on the political struggle.

Just a few days after this meeting, on 15 July, 1962, de Gaulle sent a personal letter to Adenauer in which he again emphasised Franco-German cooperation in the context of a European Political Union.

"In this respect," he wrote, "next September will undoubtedly be decisive; either because the 'Six' agree in Rome to an agreement on a union which we have outlined together and which encompasses Franco-German solidarity; or because we feel obliged to organise this solidarity as a matter of our own concern and leave it up to the other four (members of the European Economic Community) to join us at any time."

During the next (again private) meeting on 5 September, 1962, Adenauer went one step further.

Once again, the concern about the lack of European political union was the starting-point.

Adenauer, however, no longer called for a loose "consultative arrangement", but for a "precise and fixed agreement between France and Germany which enables a lasting link between both nations and provides their hundred millions citizens with a consistent and coordinated policy, including a policy towards the East Bloc."

Adenauer stressed that he wanted some tangible sign of success.

De Gaulle asked him whether he could envisage an arrangement based on solidarity between France and Germany without abandoning the idea of the "Six" and without ruling out the possibility of British accession as well as future possibilities.

Adenauer replied in the affirmative and gave consideration to the impact of such a step for Western Europe as a whole.

Hopes were expressed that a closer link between Germany and France would act as a motor for European political union.

Both Adenauer and de Gaulle were certain that the idea would appeal to those who were still hesitant.

In a joint statement on the Treaty at a later date the remark that "the strengthening of cooperation between both countries represents an imperative step along the path to a united Europe, which is the goal of both nations" is no more than logically consistent.

The authors of the Franco-German Treaty of Cooperation were apparently fascinated by the idea of being able to create a common foundation for Europe's political future.

The question we must ask ourselves today is whether we are still utilising these existing instruments in the European way intended by the authors of the Treaty.

The original intention was that the Franco-German entente should be safeguarded in two ways.

One was the obligation to hold regular consultations.

It was hoped that Franco-German relations would be fostered regardless of the goodwill or ill-will of respective governments.

Neither Adenauer nor de Gaulle seemed to have that much confidence in their potential successors.

Conflicts, varying interests and differences of opinion, therefore, should

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■ TRADE TIES

Shevardnadze's Cocom criticism 'a red herring'

In a talk he gave to West German businessmen during his official visit to the Federal Republic of Germany Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze claimed that the Cocom list is responsible for a decline in Soviet-German trade.

The Cocom (Coordinating Committee for East-West Trade Policy) list is an index of goods and services which, for military-cum-strategic reasons, are not allowed to be exported to Communist countries by Cocom member states.

Mr Shevardnadze maintained that 20 projects had already foundered as a result of Cocom restrictions and that the outcome of over 30 projects currently being negotiated is uncertain because of what he called the "damned Cocom list".

The Soviet Foreign Minister could have named any figure he wanted, since his criticism — which Moscow has levelled for many years — is unfounded.

The Soviets hesitated a long time before responding to the request by the Bonn Economics Ministry to name names.

The failure of trade negotiations in the two (not twenty) cases referred to in the official Soviet reply was in no way connected with the Cocom list.

In one case, a German firm broke off negotiations because the services required by the Soviets simply exceeded the scope of its productive capacity. In the other, the trade deal was rejected because of Soviet insistence on interest subsidies.

Although some of the items on the list of negotiated goods are also covered by Cocom stipulations firms have generally been able to find a legal means of circumventing regulations if the Soviets are really keen on the realisation of a project.

One solution, for example, is to supply products whose technology is not advanced enough to qualify for the Cocom list.

In many cases the Soviets don't want the most sophisticated technology anyway. They prefer to play it safe by using tried and tested technology.

Creativity and effectivity are bound to suffer, however, if planning is the key aspect.

Mr Shevardnadze's accusation is not borne out by the realities of Soviet-German trade, which has declined during the last years.

The main reason for restrained buying by the Soviets is the slump in raw materials prices and falling foreign exchange earnings.

Although Cocom restrictions may be partly responsible their influence should not be overrated.

There is a general ban on the supply of military goods and nuclear energy.

There can be no exchange of modern armament systems between countries with fundamentally different economic and social systems.

Trading in products which are both militarily relevant and can be used in industry (double use) is particularly problematic.

The exact classification is often a political problem.

Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, for example, has called for a thinning out of the Cocom list.

There used to be fundamental reform of the Cocom list every two years. The associated consensus procedure required the approval of almost all the western industrialised countries in the OECD.

Due to the rapid pace of technological change a system of regular revision has now been adopted. Products which are freely available on the world market must also be marketable to East Bloc countries without restrictions.

The system of classifying Cocom products was less rigidly applied during the years of detente than following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan during the 80s.

It now looks as if a solution to this problem is in sight. The INF agreement between the USA and the Soviet Union is highly significant in this context.

The president of the Standing Conference of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHT), Otto Wolff von Amerongen, links hopes for an improved exchange of technology with an increase in the number of joint ventures and inter-plant cooperation.

The Soviet Union is still pretty hesitant in this field and has not yet made full use of all its possibilities.

A prerequisite for such cooperation is the profitability of such projects for both sides.

The Soviet Foreign Minister's criticism of the Cocom list is basically a red herring.

It cannot be denied that, apart from a few exception, the technology lag of Soviet industry has increased. This has been openly confirmed in speeches by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachov.

Reference has been made to a technological bipartitioning of the world.

Many Soviet products simply cannot be sold on western markets. This barrier to successful trading cannot be blamed on the restrictions imposed by the Cocom list.

Hans-Jürgen Mahnke
(Die Welt, Bonn, 20 January 1988)

Pas de deux becomes a quickstep

Continued from page 5

not be allowed to develop, and perhaps escalate, on their own, but should be shaped by the discipline of formalised dialogue.

This obligation to maintain dialogue has fully served its humane objective in relations between the two countries.

The second way of safeguarding the Franco-German entente was broadly-based social and cultural exchange.

It is not merely by chance that both politicians talked of youth exchange, town-twinning and promoting Franco-German circles of friends right from the outset.

Up until today, all these activities — youth exchange, town-twinning and circles of friends — have remained the most precious foundations of friendship between the two countries.

Nevertheless, it is in the field of cultural exchange in particular that a lack of understanding still remains.

It has often proved difficult to understand the differences in each other's basic political structures and values.

Germans, for example, are often astonished at certain manifestations of a pronounced national awareness in France.

The French for their part have their misgivings about the idea of a reunified Germany.

Reservations exist on both sides about economic policy egotisms.

There is a basic mistrust with regard to signs of German efforts to seek new ways of defining its position between East and West and in Central Europe.

These cultural dispositions are reflected in everyday politics.

A quarter of a century after the signing of the Franco-German Treaty on Cooperation there is still a paradoxical mixture of proximity and remoteness in the relationship between the two countries.

The European idea pervading the Treaty should be able to overcome this situation.

Twenty-five years after the signing of the treaty of friendship the acid test for the French-German relationship undoubtedly lies in its function as a focal point for a Europe which works.

The headlines in European policy during recent years reveal the current relevance of this aspect.

This relevance is based on a long European policy tradition following the Second World War.

The experience gathered during this historical development can be summarised in a kind of European basic law: progress in the field of integration policy is only possible if there is prior agreement between France and the Federal Republic of Germany.

It was Franco-German cooperation which provided the leadership stimuli at the decisive stages of European policy.

This experience also applies in the negative sense: wherever France and the Federal Republic of Germany failed to agree the result was stagnation.

There are plenty of positive and negative examples for the validity of this assumption in European policy:

- the setting up of the European Coal and Steel Community (1950/51);
- the failure of the European Defence Community (1954);
- the setting up of the European Economic Community and Euratom (1957);
- the failure of the Fouchet negotiations for a Political Union (1962);
- the introduction of a veto in the decision-making practice of the Council of Ministers (1966);
- the development of European Political Cooperation and of the European Council during the Seventies;
- the creation of the European Monetary System (1979);
- the setting up of Eureka (1985);
- the compromise enabling the Single European Act to come into force (1986/87);
- the impetus for greater Western European security cooperation since the beginning of the Eighties.

Successful or unsuccessful Franco-German cooperation was always a decisive factor in all cases.

The realisation of this fact, however, is often reduced to the naive expectation that there is some special *brand of* Franco-German cooperation harmony and a convergence of interests.

In many of the historical examples given this was not the case.

Wherever success was achieved, however, both countries understood how to bridge divergences and tie up differences of opinion in negotiating packages in order to achieve European progress at a European level.

The basic law of the key-role played by France and the Federal Republic of Germany could and should be the real subject-matter of a future-orientated retrospective of the 1963 Treaty.

A Franco-German retrospective *for the* future of Europe will again confirm the usual insight following historical jubilees, namely that well-meaning commemoration alone is not enough.

Werner Weidenfeld
(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 15 January 1988)

■ FINANCE

New we'll-cut-subsidies talk brings new round of yawns



From the dizzy heights of the officially forecast federal budget deficit figure of DM40bn for 1988 Bonn Finance Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg has *announced* that he intends cutting the deficit by DM10bn in 1989. Both announcements are viewed sceptically.

Along with the tried and tested remedy of higher excise taxes and "stricter spending discipline" Stoltenberg hopes to achieve this goal by cutting back subsidies.

His announcement even gets his own party, the CDU, yawning, and many party colleagues have derisively stated that they are dying to hear how Stoltenberg intends putting this ambitious proposal into practice.

There is reason enough for such derision. Stoltenberg would prefer people to forget what he said during the final years in which his party was on the opposition benches, when he promised that he would cut the elephant grass of subsidisation with a lawn mower and begin with an at least five per cent first cut.

He didn't even bother to try once he was appointed Finance Minister in Bonn.

Even the junior partner in the Bonn government coalition, the FDP, eventually climbed in with Stoltenberg's paperchase through the tax jungle following its initial objective of linear cuts to finance the 1990 tax reform.

Apart from a few Don Quixotes who occasionally tilt at the windmills of subsidy-mindedness, the CDU, FDP and CSU are unusually agreed that the system of financial support for many individuals and specific occupational groups and branches of industry should not be shaken.

The opinion that a bold attempt to cut the billions of marks of subsidies is the best approach is only upheld in the grey area of politics, by the economists, the economic institutes and the Taxpayers Federation.

Altogether, roughly DM120bn is channelled of taxpayer's money are channelled via the Federal, Länder and local governments and (separately for farmers) via the coffers of the European Community into a bottomless pit.

Half of this figure comes from Bonn, just under DM31bn as direct financial aid from 107 sources and DM27bn as tax concessions from 113 sources.

Even the cutbacks envisaged after 1990 don't do much to reduce this figure.

In the fight agains the many-headed Hydra the development of the budget could get some unexpected support.

As long as it looked as if Stoltenberg would be able to keep on reducing the federal government's new borrowings figure — with the help of the Bundesbank profits he had already moved down below a figure DM25bn — the subsidisation system was a regulatory policy nuisance, but only really irritated the guardians of the free market economy.

Now, however, the matter has assumed a new dimension. The forecast deficit of DM40bn is expected by many to move to DM43bn, DM45bn or even DM50bn.

As Chancellor Kohl has ruled out any increase in value added tax during this legislative period ("I give you my word") the financial resolutions of the special European Community summit will have to be paid for via greater debt.

Bonn will probably be called upon to make a special contribution to the European Community kitty to mark this year's German presidency.

The Airbus project, space research contributions in the interests of Franco-German friendship, and dramatically declining revenue — due to weaker economic growth, monetary policy activities and the fact that a growing number of unemployed drop out of the ranks of taxpayers — are bound to produce higher budget deficits in Bonn.

Bonn has no option but to demonstrate greater thrift.

The Bonn government can only regain scope for fiscal and economic policy action if it tackles those items which can be directly influenced: direct and indirect subsidies.

It is an illusion to believe that all the subsidies could be removed, let alone before the budgetary deadline, even though this would be so beneficial.

Experts have estimated that a scaling down of subsidies by half would, in the ideal case, create a million jobs.

Or, as estimated by the Taxpayers Federation, that the reduction of subsidies by a third (by roughly DM40bn per annum) would enable a roughly twenty per cent reduction in income tax. According to this calculation, each average earner would receive DM1,500 more each year after tax.

The assumption that certain fields would survive without federal assistance is unrealistic.

As long as service enterprises such as the Federal Railways have to offer social prices (does it really have to?) it is bound to run up deficits.

A certainty

It also seems essential to keep farmers on the subsidy payroll to back up adjustment processes.

It will also probably remain essential to grant a rent rebate to a certain circle of people.


Pruning subsidies cannot be effected on an either/or basis, either selectively or in line with the lawn mower approach.

Both methods are possible and necessary. Some subsidies could be scrapped immediately.

Take the government's saving promotion scheme, for example.

At a cost of roughly DM3.5bn, it is either available for people who cannot take advantage of the scheme because they haven't got enough money to save or it is taken advantage of by people who cash in on the state savings bonus as if it were some kind of gratuity, either in the form of a tax-deductible special allowance, a direct bonus for savings agreements in the name of family members, or as a bonus for asset formation.

According to the Taxpayers Federation the transaction costs of the employer's contribution to the tax-deductible savings scheme and the handling of this transaction by banks and finance offices cost roughly DM3.4bn in 1986, twice as much as the savings scheme bonus figure itself.



The administrative costs in the case of rent rebate is estimated at approximately DM400m, ten per cent of the rebate figure itself.

In the field of residential building the cost of the new tax concessions for building owner-occupied houses are exorbitant.

Despite the undisputed housing surplus of between 250,000 and one million units public funds are still poured into this field and misallocations in council flats produce an unjust system.

A tax reduction potential of between DM5bn and DM6bn exists in this sector alone.

Money could also be obtained from the farming industry.

The prior VAT deduction of 13 per cent which farmers can claim regardless of the size of their farms, their incomes and their needs, even though only pay 8 per cent on everything they buy themselves, costs an annual DM2.7bn — and obviously benefits the more better-off farmers most.

It hardly helps the small farmers and costs the government a fortune.

The steel industry received roughly DM10bn in subsidies between 1980 and 1985.

These not only failed to improve the situation, but also delayed processes of adjustment.

The DM6bn handed out to the Arbed Saarstahl steelworks did not ensure its survival.

A figure of DM7bn goes into the mining sector. Thousands of billions of subsidies since 1960 have been unable to prevent the loss of two thirds of the 490,200 jobs at that time.

Firms such as Siemens, Daimler and AEG recieve billions of marks in subsidies from the research budget of the Bonn Research and Technology Ministry year in, year out.

This is a welcome extra income for projects in areas in which they would have had to conduct research anyway for reasons of competitiveness.

This long list shows how much money could be made available if the need were dire enough to make significant regulatory policy decisions essential.

Subsidies retard the dynamics of a free market economy system and the dictate of social commitment.

Subsidies delay structural adjustments (steel, coal, shipbuilding); they give unnecessary support in certain fields (research); they function as a substitute for capital (Airbus); they have free-ride effects (in regional promotion, where a subsidy or tax concessions is already waiting for every necessary investment); they encourage injustice (farm industry, employees); and they prevent labour mobility.

Subsidies cost a lost of money, since either taxpayers or the state (via more borrowing) have to pay for lame ducks and loss-making firms.

Subsidies disguise hidden unemployment. They make employees feel that their jobs are secure, even though they would be better advised to seek employment in other, more modern industries.

Subsidies are like drugs, a larger dose is needed every time before the effect is felt.

It is undisputed that that the reduction of subsidies would give the legislator greater scope for a more just tax system for all, employers as well as employees.

Lower taxes and other fiscal charges enhance the competitiveness of industry, attract investors, create new jobs and give people more money to boost sales.

A reduction of subsidies means less borrowing, which has a healthy influence on interest rates and thus on the costs of all borrowers, not least on the government's interest burden.

The state government of Lower Saxony already introduced a bill for the reduction of subsidies in the Bundesrat, but found itself out on a limb.

The idea was that a target of, say, reducing subsidies by half would within a certain period would be set by the legislator.

This should only be done on condition that the money saved be directly rechannelled into general tax benefits.

This could be effected in stages. The lawn mower method would reduce all subsidies, with the exception of those which have already been adjusted beforehand or which are absolutely essential (Federal Railways, farm sector, coal), by ten per cent in the first year, the cuts then increasing progressively.

Such a solution would prepare subsidy recipients in industry for the day on which they receive very few or no subsidies.

These recipients would then know that greater efficiency is needed to survive or that survival is impossible.

Individual citizens, whether rent rebate beneficiaries or the beneficiaries of tax benefits would realise when they see the falling tax rates that the path of redistribution was expensive.

Eduard Neumaier
(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 15 January 1988)

■ AID

Overseas service volunteers get a taste of the real thing in a mock village

The house has clay walls built on to a wooden frame. The corrugated-iron roof is shaped like a tent. In front of the house there is an oven made of old drums and a broken piece of stovepipe. There are also clay stoves.

Next to the house there is a water tank and a straw-covered earth cellar, where vegetables are kept. Close-by there is a wind-wheel with vanes made of old, coloured tin in the middle of a small garden.

The whole set-up in a field next to the Flensburg Teacher Training College does look a little odd.

Dieter Klein, lecture at the college, explained: "We have set up mock conditions that our students will encounter when they go to a posting abroad." It is part of a training programme for overseas service volunteers, unique in Europe.

It was a damp, cold winter's day in Flensburg. There was no hammering, sawing and building activity. The field experiment for future developing country helpers was deserted, because of the weather. Practical training will only begin again when the summer comes.

Then student overseas service volunteers will begin constructing things with natural materials found on the spot. They will produce simple pieces of equipment and tools, generate energy from wind and sun, cultivate food without using chemical fertilizers and much more besides.



Dieter Klein said: "It goes without saying that we cannot work out here technical solutions for the Third World." But students can be trained on *how to do some things, how to improvise and be creative, and how to deal with state bureaucracies.*

Without wanting it the students have already had some experience of this. When plans were made for a topping-out festival officialdom stepped in.

The Schleswig-Holstein building authority insisted that only a regular building firm could put up the house — at a price, that would be paid from state funds. The cost was much more than the students' original estimate.

Later there were additional conditions. Klein recalled that the students' motivation took a knock. "Many asked if this expensive gift was in line with our intentions. We could see from this just how people in the Third World must feel if they were blessed in the same way for projects from abroad."

Nevertheless this was also valuable experience and preparation for voluntary service overseas, for getting over many bureaucratic hurdles.

The motto of the four-semester course is "as much practical work as possible." There is more to this than a new understanding of the role of the overseas service volunteer and an attempt to train a new type of helper.

Highly qualified experts, who know their way around a special subject, are not needed in the villages and small towns of the Third World. Speaking in *western technical terms they often cannot see the wood for the trees.*

To them a "technical educationalist" is just another possibility for offering aid to the Third World.

Uwe Rehling is a lecturer at the Teacher Training College. The training course was his brainchild. He said: "The overseas service volunteer must have a lot of knowledge over a wide range of subjects. Thon he must give priority to human requirements and not to technical possibilities."

He continued: "People must not have to adjust to technology, but technology to people."

The key words are: adjusted technology. This means for developing countries technology that is not too expensive but which creates many jobs.

It also means a technology that does not require too many raw materials, but which is easy to set up and simple to repair.

But what is pre-eminently important *is it must be technology that serves basic human needs (food, housing, clothing, water energy).*

Rehling added the rider, however, that adjusted technology did not mean second-class technology. "It could also well include high-tech products such as solar or wind energy, for instance," he said.

Technology from the industrialised countries has often not been a blessing to the Third World. All too frequently is has made the countries dependent again and destroyed traditional ways of life.

This is why the Federal Republic government has now adopted the slogan: "Help people to help themselves."

But the realities all too often make a nonsense of declared intentions. All too often a big show is made of expensive and technically lavish major projects that bring in lucrative contracts to the donor country.

It is necessary to re-think and act differently if development aid is to do justice to its own claims.

It is amazing that so many obstacles have been put in the way of the Flensburg College. The first course began in the winter semester 1984/1985. It was inevitably in its infancy. A further trial period of at the most three years should follow on, but finances are a problem.

Ernst-Heinrich Hethey, press spokesman for the College said: "The Kiel Education Ministry has only approved the course so long as expenditure is not affected. That means that all costs have to be funded by our budget."

Funds are limited in a university that has only 600 registered students, one of the smallest in the Federal Republic.

If it had not been for the support given by the churches and their development aid services, such as the North Elbe Church, the Flensburg Church Community, the North Elbe Mission in Hamburg and the Overseas Serices, for personnel costs and financing the students for several months practical training in India, the Flensburg experiment would have had to fall by the wayside long ago.

It is the students who suffer most from financial problems, for there is no grant for the course. Hethey said that all attempts to get grants had come to nothing.

"In effect that adds up to a ban on this kind of training," he said. *Students who do not have savings or who cannot* find a job in the Flensburg area, and there are not many going, could not manage.

Frequently students have had to break off their studies or postpone taking the examination.

Still the first trained "technical educationalists" will graduate from the Teacher Training College this year.

Hans Ruedi Zurbrügg, who is Swiss, is one of the lucky ones. The Swiss Mission has paid for his training in Flensburg. The reason for this is that Zurbrügg, a truck mechanic by training, worked for this organisation as a development aid helper in Zaire for ten years.

Did he learn anything at Flensburg? He said emphatically that he had. "We live in rather isolated conditions in Basankusu in Zaire. I have found it very stimulating being here."

He already has his head full of projects, which he will tackle as soon as he gets back.

He has, for instance, thought about using the water power of a nearby river to work a sawmill. He is considering replacing the manioc mill operated by woman, at present driven by a diesel engine, with power without using oil.

He would also like to set up a *training* programme for the village *mechanics.* And so on and so on.

Hans Ruedi Zurbrügg stopped speaking and smiled saying: "Probably I have more plans than I have time to get them working."

But Zurbrügg is an exception, one of the few who look to the future with optimism. Many others are still waiting for a secure job, although they were needed.

Corinna Reinke

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 17 January 1988)



Continued from page 1

re-enact Rapallo and throw in its lot with the Soviet Union.

Bonn cannot, of course, allow its Ostpolitik to go by the board merely to take the wind out of the sails of French suspicions.

Indeed, Paris ought jointly with Bonn and its other allies to sound out the possibilities the Gorbachov era offers Europe.

Many French government officials are reluctant to act in this context and Bonn must bear two points in mind if France's commitment is to be grist to the European mill.

It must come up with constructive answers to French proposals and it must also lay down clear priorities with regard to the political union of Western Europe.

It was Paul Valéry, the French poet, who shrewdly observed that history has often arranged an assignation between France and Germany but that only one of them has turned up on time.

Not even in the wake of its silver jubilee is the Elysée Treaty any guarantee that they will take up before they have evaporated the opportunities afforded by the future.

Christoph Bertram

(Die Zeit, Hamburg, 22 January 1988)

■ AVIATION

Development decisions, plunging dollar, cause problems for Airbus

When the Europeans decided 17 years ago to start up Airbus, Americans thought it would turn out to be a white elephant like Concorde. But Airbus has turned out to be one of Europe's few examples of successful cooperation. It has emerged as a major contender in the battle for the world's civil aviation market. Since Airbus' twin-engine, wide-body A 300 went into service with Air France in 1974, more than 375 Airbuses have joined 61 airlines around the world. Its A320 is the fastest-selling aircraft in history. Boeing and McDonnell Douglas, the big US makers, have seen their combined share of the market drop from 77 per cent to 66 per cent between 1985 and last year - while Airbus' rose from 11 per cent to 25 per cent. But things are not looking too rosy any more, as Günter Buschmann reports for *Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt*. For a start, the plunging dollar has hit revenue. And this at a time when European governments are beginning to ask tougher questions before forking out subsidies.

A war has been raging between the European and American civil-aircraft industries for years. It really got going when Airbus started biting into the American market.

Now anxious about the marketability of Airbus, the Americans are complaining of unfair European practices. Ironically, about 30 per cent of an Airbus' parts are American made — the A 300 has about 45 per cent. The A300 is the first aircraft powered by the new General Electric CF6-80c2 engines.

However the aircraft market is becoming more expesive for Airbus - a predominantly German-French consortium with British, Italian and Spanish participation.

The dollar has taken a plunge and in the aircraft business this is the currency of payment. The dollar is now so cheap that it's not worth much in D-marks anymore. nevertheless a large amount of the costs for the production of the aircraft have to be paid in marks. Even the introducrtion of cheap the General Electric engines will not balance out the losses on the other side of the Atlantic.

The Europeans are now in a hopeless situation. Even when the dollar was worth over three marks, Airbus still made losses.

The losses were, however, foreseeable. They are structural, so understandable. The starting costs are so high that every company takes time to win them back.

American firms were not bombed during the war and have had the advantage of being able to use surpluses from other aircraft to finance new ones. Airbus has no old aircraft. The state had to take over the role as financier. The decision to press ahead with the A330/A340 projects, costing some $4bn represents one of the century's largest *single committments of state-sponsored* money.

But after 15 years, state financing is becoming harder to justify. Airbus should by now be making some kind of profit. There are two reasons why this has not happened.

First, the enterprise is organised so complicatedly and expensively that profits are nearly impossible. The logistics of having the final manufacturing stage split between Hamburg and Toulouse is absurd.

Second, Airbus is constructing an A330B model — this rate of develoment, although demanded by market forces, is too fast. And in doing so, an A310 model which would have been ideal, has been pushed aside. The wings alone for the A330 cost DM1bn.

Even the A300 is not getting near profitability because too many variations have been produced too quickly.

Airbus is planning a twin-jet 400-seat monster version of the A330, which will have a range of 8,000 kilometres. And an A340 with the same fuselage is to *have a range of 12,000 kilometres.*

Reinhardt Abraham, Head of Technology at Lufthansa, said that this is a necessary step but added that it shoves the break even point of the entire Airbus family somewhere far into the future — probably next century.

More public money will be necessary to finance it. Presumably engine manufacturers like Rolls-Royce and Snecma will get more subsidies.

Airbus manager sell their product to the government by saying that the aircraft have a rosy future. There is a market for about a 1,000 large airlines of the A320 and the A330/340 class. Airbus has to sell at least 600 to break even.

This is a forecast which is as wrong as the many others with which the industry has used to get subsidies. Everybody knows that nobody can predict further ahead than two decades.

This is a problem for the industry as a whole. The difference is that in the U.S. Boeing and McDonnell settle the costs internally until the profits flow. The developments financed by public American money remain the property of the firms and can be used commercially. In Europe public finance is a straight direct subsidy. Firms have to reapply every year.

But the subsidy issue has still become a major source of friction between the U.S. and Europe. Last year a delegation of Americans went to Bonn on a "fact-finding mission" during which they expressed criticism about subsidy levels.

They hinted that if production of A330 and A340 went ahead, they would consider some sort of retaliation.

Airbus pointed out, the Americans are heavily supported by generous defence orders. They also pointed out that Airbus is a big customer for U.S. components. They have bought about $3.4bn worth in the past ten years. Both sides have agreed to examine the issue under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations in Geneva.

Boeing's Jumbo 747 is a good example of how long it can take to reach a profit threshold. It came on the market in 1969. Despite its monopoly of the market it still took 15 years to sell the 500 units necessary to break even.

The new 757 and 767 aircraft have missed the market and are now in the red. The losses are balanced by the surpluses from the Jumbo as well as the Boeing's successful 737 twin-jetter.

It's going to take time for Airbus as well. If one combines the time factor with the volatile dollar and complicated assembly arrangements of Airbus, it' obvious that subsidies will have to go beyond 2010. Only then might the final aircraft of the enterprise be produced without making a loss.

The paucity of returns on investment is what makes it so difficult for the governments to subsidise any enterprise, regardless of how good market prospects look.

What can Daimler-Benz make of a controlling share in Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm (MBB) when it takes 20 years to get any profits.

The state will have to continue footing the bill. The consequence could be a protectionist dividing of the market. The Europeans will - under the leadership of Heinz Ruhnau, Franz Josef Strauss, the state backed Lufthansa and the state owned Air France - be stopped from buying Boeing if there are suitable Airbuses available although the dollar has made Boeings cheaper.

Airbus will continue efforts to develop a market in East bloc countries like East Germany, Poland and the Soviet Union.

This will also require state support. Presumably the U.S. embargo on the export of American technology to the East, such Airbus' American General Electric engines, will be ignored.

The Americans themselves are trying to hold on to their domestic markets by pushing a "Buy American" campaign.

It's not unusual now to hear announcements on the New York route reassuring passengers that 45 per cent of the components of the A330, on which they are flying, are American made. This shows how nationalistic the current *Zeitgeist* has become.

Whoever buys foreign products now in America without good reason comes under suspicion. The rate of the dollar makes it easy though for people to buy American.

If Airbus wants to expand its market in the U.S. it will have to pay a high price.

Airbus will have to let American companies, such as Lockheed, McDonnell Douglas and General Dynamic, construct airframes under licence.

Even the construction of the wings would not be a problem for them. The engines are American anyway. Unfortunately Airbus would make hardly any profits from the arrangement.

The polarisation of the aircraft construction industry in the hands of two such giants is making the free market smaller. It's killing off the range of choice made possible by having different manufacturers. Lufthansa used these possibilities brilliantly.

The free markets for small aircraft and business machines are Asia and Australia.

The Europeans and Americans have forgotten during their struggle for the big markets that these markets have been taken over by Brazilians, Canadians, Indonesians and Dutch.

Günther Buschmann

(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt, Hamburg, 10 January 1988)

■ BOOKS

Taking the electronic road towards a national library for Everyman



Anyone who goes into a medium-sized library these days is immediately confronted with the many hundreds of volumes of reference catalogues from abroad, headed by the enormous American undertaking, *The National Union Catalogue*.

This reference work is made up of almost 700 volumes and includes the contents of American libraries up to 1957, with annual additions since then.

In Britain there is the *British Library*, which includes something like ten million books, regarded as a national as well as an international collection. The catalogue has been prepared in the best British tradition and is a delight to bibliophiles the world over.

France is not far behind. Recently the 231st volume of the much respected *Bibliothèque Nationale* catalogue in Paris was published. Bibliophiles must still wait for an index of anonymous and pseudo-anonymous works that turned up in Paris libraries between the end of the 19th century up to 1959. Only the period between 1960 and 1970 has been recorded.

Even Italy has prepared a catalogue of collections of books from Venice to Naples in a *Catalogo collectivo*.

And what of Germany? The idea of a complete catalogue first emerged in Berlin. There is no country in the world that possesses so many well-stocked and various libraries. University, civic, municipal, church and monastic libraries are scattered all over the country, augmented by the private collections of former members of the nobility and merchant class.

The Royal Library in Berlin, that since the foundation of the empire took on more and more the character of a national library, possesses many of these books in its collection of more than three million volumes, but it cannot be measured up against the collections in London, Paris or Washington, and it has acquired only a fraction of German books published around 1500.

At the turn of the century a modest, but efficient, aid was created, the Information Bureau for German Libraries, firstly established in the Royal Library and later transferred to the Prussian State Library. This has been welcomed by researchers and institutions the world over.

It includes several million entries from a wide-range of German libraries and is the basis for the collected catalogue of Prussian, and since 1936, of German libraries.

It has been much mocked, for it was planned with such perfectionism. It has only progressed, alphabetically, from A to "Beethordnung." This fragment of a catalogue in large format made up of 14 volumes can be inspected in any German library.

But Berlin bibliographers are not to blame that the enterprise never materialised. In the last days of the war the typescript of the German collected catalogue was burnt in Pomerania.

If the typescript had been copied or put on film, as is usual now with so many catalogues, the German academic world would have a biographical aid of the first order, inspite of the losses sustained during the last war. As it is this has been denied the academic world for almost half a century.

Gradually the idea has taken hold that a people cannot allow itself the luxury, in the long term, of being informed *about its past only in an inadequate and* fragmentary form, at least as far as the printed word goes.

But bluntly that was and still is the situation after the destruction of Berlin, despite regional central catalogues, flourishing inter-library lending and integrated electronic-data network systems.

Anyone who wanted to get a swift overview of international publishing in the 18th century would have gone to the Leipzig book fair or Göttingen, where the University Library had swiftly gained world renown. Last year Göttingen University celebrated the 250th anniversary of its foundation.

In the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th, the Prussian State Library was a Mecca for scholars. Now they have to go to Munich, if they do not fancy London or Washington, if they want to get to know in Germany about international book production, quickly and in detail.

The Bavarian State Library has five and a half million books with 150,000 volumes added *annually*. *It is the top* library in West and East Germany and in Germany has *de facto* the status of a central information centre of international standing.

Neither the State Library of the Prussian Cultural Heritage in Berlin nor, unfortunately, the renowned Lower Saxony State and University Library in Göttingen, can remotely compete with the Bavarian State Library.

For years the Göttingen Library has been the victim of a wasting disease as a result of the irresponsible education and scientific policies of the state.

Yet the Bavarian State Library is badly in need of publicity. Shortly new acquisitions can be electronically retrieved, worldwide, as is the case with Göttingen.

But Munich's strength is based on its historic stock of books. Since the division of Berlin the Munich library has provided a home for the largest collection of incunabula of the 16th century in the German-speaking world.

Printed publications before 1500 will shortly be presented in a separate catalogue. These works from the 16th century together with the Wölfenbüttel publications form the basis for the index of writings appearing in the German-speaking world of the 16th century.

Now Göttingen and Munich have put the catalogue of their historic stock of old publications on an electronic data system, and soon the titles will be available "on line" worldwide.

At the same time a printed pre-publication of the alphabetic catalogue of the Bavarian State Library will appear, made up of 662,000 titles, being the Library's acquisitions between 1501 and 1840.

This pre-publication will be published in about 60 volumes early in the 1990s by Saur-Verlag, Munich, and afterwards replaced by a final book edition, which, along with electronic data, will be of value to book-lovers and bibliographers. It is hoped that a similar arrangement will be *available for the* Göttingen library as soon as possible.

Hopefully the full significance of this pioneer work will be appreciated. A catalogue is more than a dumb enumeration *of all the books under one roof*. A catalogue can be read like an exciting book — like a history book as well.

Casually leafing through past one historical catch-word after another can set the historical imagination in motion.

Out of the sea of titles one emerges, *Apocalypsis Bohemica* dating from 1620. That was the year when a decisive event of world significance took place on German soil.

The Elector Maximilian II of Bavaria, with the most modern army of the time, defeated his Protestant adversary Friedrich V of the Palatinate at the Battle of the White Hill in Bohemia.

This sealed the fate of Calvinism and settled the survival of Catholicism on German soil. The attempt of Protestant states in revolt to install an imperial antagonist in Prague was thwarted. Germany was to remain bi-confessional, as it still is.

A title dating from 1622 reads *Apocalyptische Satzstück und Ursachen von itzo instehender großen Veränderungen vieler mächtigster Regimenten*. (The apocalytic text and sources of the present great changes of many of the most powerful authorities).

To people of the time only St John's Revelation of the apocalyptic destruction of the world could have had the same significance as this incomprehensible event, the Battle of White Hill, that shook the foundations of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.

In the first two volumes of the work published, under the headings such as illustration, impression, parting, answer, report, apologia (all beginning with A in German) there can be found a wealth of writings on this battle, that Munich, where Maximilian had his residence, preserved in the royal library.

The names of the first great publicists emerge, Abraham a Santa Clara, Aegidius Albertinus, Antoine Arnauld and Johann Arnd, all abundantly represented. Literary sensations are also included such as the Portuguese Amadis novel, swiftly translated into every European language.

There are also specialised writings of every kind, of course, that at a glance give us some idea of scientific activity at the beginning of the 16th century. This aspect of the collection only came to a standstill in Napoleon's times.

There is not a page in the new catalogue that does not have the sad note: no longer available. The Bavarian State Library had to pay its tribute to the madness of war and lost a half million books.

There were two copies of the *Apocalypsis Bohemica* in the neo-Latin literature group, that sustained considerable loss. It is wonderful that these lost works are itemised; they belong to the Library's history and its acquisition policies.

Furthermore it can be known far afield that a search is one for them and hopefully they can be replaced, in part at least.

Is there everything here that one could ask for? It would have been of advantage if complete titles were given, information provided about the publisher and, if available, the donors and the people or rulers for whom the books were written.

It would also be beneficial if we *had* some idea of the circumstances, the sources and the special features of the individual publications.

But that would have meant automatically a complete (and time-consuming) re-working of the books. We have here a re-worked reproduction of the old catalogue entries.

It is hoped that this very welcome "short-title catalogue" will be followed by a special index of the particularly valued volumes in stock such as the books from Baroque literature. What is important for everyone, who has had to be patient for years with the old printing method of cataloguing used in Germany, is that a beginning has been made.

German libraries, notoriously involved in current duties, have at least made available to the public a catalogue of the books they have. Everything is helpful, from a short-title catalogue to a special bibliography.

Then perhaps one day an idea, that first saw the light of day in Germany, will be realised; to store the titles in the book world in a single index and make it available to everyone. This means using micro-electronics, the technology of the future, in the service of the past, protecting it not replacing it.

Klaus Garber

(*Die Zeit*, Hamburg, 8 January 1988)



Taking up the computer challenge: the Bavarian State Library in Munich. (Photo: Süddeutscher Verlag)

■ FILMS

Belated recognition for the cartoon

Solweig von Kleist from Paris, Gerrit van Dyck from Harlem in Holland and Albrecht Ade from Stüttgart will take their places in a Stuttgart cinema next month for a week of cartoon films.

They make up the jury for the 4th International Cartoon Film Festival in Stuttgart.

During that week they will have to watch 300 film entries, on average lasting between seven to ten minutes.

Festival director Albrecht Ade said: "We have to see that the film is not old-hat, that it is artistic and technically up to standard." Albrecht Ade is a professor at Stuttgart's art academy.

Otto Alder is the organisation director of the Cartoon Film Festival, taking place from 5 to 10 February.

He said: "Many people regard the cartoon film as a film type for children. That is idiotic. We want to change that view."

Albrecht Ade believes that the idea of the cartoon being for children is "a dead end." There is something more to the cartoon film beyond Walt Disney. Ade wants to reveal "the connections between painting and the cartoon film," and demonstrate the technical developments of the genre.

He has two roles as a film-maker: with the software in animation computers and the implements of painting.

It took longer for the cartoon to be recognised as a work of art in its own right in the Federal Republic than elsewhere. The same was true of photography, of course, and is true today with videos.

Animation artists in Britain, Belgium, Holland and France, were acknowledged as artists long ago.

Solweig von Kleist studied art teaching in Berlin. She now works as a cartoon film-maker in Paris.

She made the film *Criminal Tango*, that has won many prizes and which has been shown before in Stuttgart.

With aid from film promotion funds and with state television as co-producer, she can spend a whole year in France making a cartoon film with a budget of DM70,000 — working alone after the notion of the better known film-makers associated with the New German Film. Not such a long time ago she was offered a very lucrative contract from abroad — she designed the animation for a video for the British rock star David Bowie.

Gerrit van Dyck, 49, works "totally independent." He is a Dutch experimental film-maker and works on the frontiers of art. He has so far brought out 20 cartoon films.

After years of being ignored people involved in animated films feel that they are at last getting recognition. Public interest in witty productions full of tricks is mounting.

Cinéastes, mostly between 14 and 30, have discovered the cartoon as sophisticated entertainment.

Cartoon films, full of tempo and stylistically polished, are well suited to current design ideas.

There were more than 600 entries for the 4th Stuttgart Cartoon Film Festival, competing for the prize worth DM25,000.

Entries came from Moscow and Montreal, Japan and Australia.

Industry is also involved. IBM is the main sponsor and provided DM20,000.

Prize-money also came from high-tech fims and banks.


The Stuttgart Festival planners have been able to double the budget they have available: this time round it is DM200,000.

Manager Ade expects a "real festival atmosphere." The attractions of the film festival will be increased by documentary exhibitions, several workshops and the participation of international representatives from the cartoon film industry.

Ade said: "We have now become more professional."

Joe Bauer

(*Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, 5 January 1988)



Lone survivor: cinema poster painter Willi Laschet at work. (Photo: dpa)

Museum shows the reality and the illusion

Who has had the chance of sitting at Sam Spade's desk? Not many. Humphrey Bogart was one of the few. But with the opening of the new section of the German Film Museum in Frankfurt all that will be changed.

There is the office with a view of the towering skyscrapers of San Francisco, the view that Dashiell Hammett's legendary detective of *The Maltese Falcon*, himself saw.

This office is not there just to be seen; the visitor is invited to sit in the casual, leather swivel-chair and is then properly put in the picture about the detective by a video-camera, mounted in a monster arriflex. The first phase of the museum was opened on the second floor of the Film Museum in 1984.

This phase included a documentary history of the cinema and the film up to the present time, extending from the Laterna Magica of the 18th century to the science-fiction monster of *Alien* of the early 1980s.

It seems inappropriate to include under one roof everything that has happened in film history between these two phases and make the exhibits comprehensible.

But the Frankfurt Museum has been highly successful in achieving its aims, and it is certain that it would be difficult to find its like anywhere else.

The history of the film is a lot more than just a succession of brilliant stars and imaginative directors, more than the sum of familiar titles, interesting narratives and spectacular frames.

Like every form of art or craft it is closely linked to prevailing circumstances, in which it is involved. This is particularly true of the art of the film which is so popular.

The cinema was the first medium of mass communication. It influenced all strata of society with its content as well as its form. It also has been stimulated by all classes of society.

From the beginning it was entertainment for those who were less privileged in our society, but they also very early on became subjects for film plots.

In addition film history is to some extent a history of industry. The art of the film is closely related to technical progress. All this can be seen in the

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From Star Wars to John Wayne: the German Film Museum in Frankfurt (Photo: Klaus Kramer)

The last of the cinema poster artists

The last of the cinema-poster painters is still going strong and lives at Hürth near Cologne.

Once every cinema had its own poster painter, producing enormous banners to advertise the films being shown.

Now the art has gone and cinemas depend on the printed advertising material provided by film distributors.

How did one become a cinema-poster painter? Willi Laschet studied painting from 1937 to 1940 at the handicrafts college in Trier. He went into the army, was taken prisoner and sent to America for internment.

On the ship going across he began to indulge himself in his former passion for painting. He did portraits of his fellow prisoner-of-war passengers.

He was later able to follow his profession in prisoner-of-war camp in America and later in Britain. He created posters, portraits and stage sets.

When released he returned to Bitburg, married and worked there as an advertising poster painter for a large brewery before being taken on by a cinema as a cinema-poster painter.

He can still remember the first film for which he painted a poster. It was Grete Garbo's *Queen Christina*.

"The pay then for a painted cinema poster was seven marks," he said.

He quickly learned to paint a giant poster in a couple of hours including a remarkable likeness of the star in the film.

He moved with his wife Agnes to Hürth in 1965. From there he served 25 cinemas in the Rhineland with cinema posters hand-painted.

He has had to deal with any number of stars during his career: Claudia

STUTTGARTER NACHRICHTEN

Cardinale, Eddie Constantine and Volker Schlöndorff.

In the middle of the 1960s Willi Laschet was one of many in his profession, but then cinemas began to close down and at the same time the printed cinema poster came on the scene.

Willi Laschet had to take on painting stage sets and designing church windows, LP sleeves and book jackets.

He does not complain now that he has a lack of work, for his clients value his precision and the speed at which he works, as they did before. Anyone who wants an original Laschet now must fork out about DM1,000.

He also became more and more interested in "real art." With artists such as HA Schult and Elke Koska he produced works of a large format, and he works privately for clients who want a painted cinema poster for the "front room."

Recently a well-known German folk-singer became one of his clients. He has had himself immortalised in a trench coat.

Willi Laschet, now 67, has produced pictures of the stars in *Dallas*, in *Dynasty* and film detective Schimanski — all done in a cinema poster format.

dpa

(*Stuttgarter Nachrichten*, 5 January 1988)

■ LITERATURE

Thomas Mann moves up to pass Brecht

Sometimes the sweetness of fame is tinged with the bitter taste of revenge.

All his life Wilhelm Raabe suffered from the fact that his two most popular novels were his early works *Die Chronik der Sperlingsgasse* and the *Hungerpastor*.

Forty years lay ahead of him after these two books were published, during which he fought against what he called the "stale nonsense of youth" and which be crowned with his *Akten des Vogelsgesangs*.

The general public, however, always remembered him for his early works, was unwilling to forgive him for the more bitter words of his later works, and took its revenge on the tragedian Raabe by admiring him solely as a humorist.

Thomas Mann appears to suffering a similar fate.

In a recent study by the Allensbach Opinion Research Institute a representative cross-section of the West German population was asked about its opinions on authors and their works.

Of those readers who named Thomas Mann as their most popular author (37 per cent) a large majority (20 per cent) described the *Buddenbrooks* as the book which means most to them.

Only five per cent named *The Magic Mountain* and no-one explictly referred to *Doctor Faustus* or Thomas Mann's novellas.

This was no different sixty years ago.

Asked by the *Literarische Welt* in 1928 about the success of his books Thomas Mann claimed that the word success could only be used with reference to the *Buddenbrooks* and *The Magic Mountain*.

The number of copies published of his novellas *Tonio Kröger* and *Death in Venice*, he said, was no higher than in the case of other "decent literature".

The author's explanation for the popularity of his two novels was their similarity.

"The Magic Mountain is a repeat of the *Buddenbrooks* at a different stage of development (*"Lebensstufe"*), which the author shares with this nation", said Mann.

The public likes something new to mean a continuation of something with which they are already familiar.

The answer given to another question asked during the Allensbach survey is all the more surprising.

The majority of respondents stated that Thomas Mann was this century's most significant German-language author.

Six names were on the list: Rilke, Musil, Brecht, Mann, Kafka and Benn.

Twenty years ago a clear majority would probably have replied Brecht in answer to the same question.

The "bourgeois" representative Mann would probably have ranked somewhere behind Benn and Musil.

Today, however, Benn and Musil together only acount for less than half a per cent (!) of the ratings, Brecht has 23 per cent (in second place) and Thomas Mann tops the list with 28 per cent.

Altogether, 49 per cent of total number of respondents said that they had read something written by Thomas Mann, and only 44 per cent something by Bertolt Brecht.

The decline in the popularity and



A personality demythologised ... Thomas Mann.

familiarity of Brecht is also reflected in the fact that his Christian name is misspelt without exception as "Berthold" in the Allensbach survey.

Thomas Mann's image has undoubtedly changed considerably during recent years.

The publication of his diaries in particular made the "magician" who always seemed aloof more of a down-to-earth human being with all his crises and shortcomings.

Whereas one used to be able to admire him without loving him it is now possible to love him without admiring him.

The demythologisation of his personality, which has always been practised by this newspaper, has made it easier for a wider public to understand his works.

If, as Nietzsche once said, justice is love with eyes that see, Thomas Mann's ranking in the survey would indicate that he is more justly assessed today than was possible twenty years ago.

Yet a feeling of uneasiness remains.

The special regard for Thomas Mann is connected with the fixation on the *Buddenbrooks* and *The Magic Mountain*.

The author himself would hardly be very pleased about this fact, since he related the popularity of these two novels to the development of the nation.

Were he still alive, wouldn't he ask whether the Germans have passed through enough *Lebensstufen* since then to be able to assimilate his later works — above all, the fateful political book *Doctor Faustus*?

Are we so retarded that we should once again content ourselves with the *Buddenbrooks*? And a small minority with the gentle horrors of *The Magic Mountain*?

Perhaps this is an attempt to hastily ignore the bitter truths with which Thomas Mann tried to stir the consciences of Germans after the Nazis came to power.

Forgotten, it would seem, is the despicable way Mann was insulted after 1945 following his refusal to return to Germany.

No-one wants to be reminded about the shameful cancellation of his invitation to visit his native town when he decided to accept prizes in Weimar as well as Frankfurt.

The *Lübecker Nachrichten* daily newspaper printed what many thought at the time: Thomas Mann is "one of the greatest among writers. Certainly not among politicians".

He is, it was claimed, simply a German writer and "everything else should be of no importance". Not at all!

The popularity of the *Buddenbrooks* should not blur the inconvenient truths about the political writer Thomas Mann.

Werner Fuld

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 4 January 1988)

Author, journalist, opponent of Hitler, Eugen Kogon dies at 84

In the world of mathematics the shortest distance between two points is a straight line," said Eugen Kogon in 1962. He completed the quote: "In the complicated world of politics the shortest distance is a catastrophe".

Kogon, a tall, impressive and lively native of Munich, has died in the Hessian town of Falkenstein at the age of 84. He knew what catastrophe was.

It began in 1933 and lasted until 1945, a period during which he worked as a labourer, blacksmith, part-time tailor and writer before being sent to Buchenwald.

Kogon did not automatically belong to the camp of Hitler's opponents.

He was not a "left-winger", but editor of the Catholic-cum-conservative weekly journal *Schönere Zukunft* in Vienna and a disciple of the extremely conservative sociologist Othmar Spann.

His later activities for the property administration company of the house of the former duchy of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha also need not have necessarily turned him into an opponent of Hitler.

However, it was during this period that he frequently travelled abroad, to Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Switzerland, Italy, France, Britain and Germany.

The comparisons he made and the information he gathered turned the conservative Catholic into a relentless campaigner against the Hitler regime.

During visits to Germany after 1937 he was twice arrested on charges of anti-National Socialist activities.

Following *Anschluss*, when Austria was brought into the German Reich, the Nazis apprehended him once and for all on 12 March, 1938.

In 1942 he began his activities in the concentration camp with the later notorious illegal opposition.

In 1943 he was on the list of persons condemned to death and was only spared execution, which was postponed three times, thanks to the influence of friends who had found a loophole in the murderous system.

Due to a telex from the Reich's Secur-



ity Head Office his "liquidation" was finally postponed until the end of the war.

Eugen Kogon critically reappraised the experiences he made during this period in his truly "educational" and most famous book *SS-Staat*.

The book's subtitle is both highly critical and succinct: *Das System der deutschen Konzentrationslager* (The System of German Concentration Camps).


The book makes it clear that the Nazi torturers were not beasts, but members of the petty bourgeoisie.

It shows how the Nazi system turned them into beasts.

Kogon describes the concentration camps as "an overgrown jungle, into which shots are fired from the outside, out of which people are dragged to be hanged, in which people are poisoned, gassed, beaten and tortured to death, where there is intrigue to gain influence and power, where people fight, deceive and betray to obtain material benefits."

His book was a bestseller and deserves to be on the bestseller lists for many years to come.

Those who did not experience the





Telex saved his life ... Eugen Kogon. (Photos: Sven Simon)

hell of the concentration camps will probably never understand how a human being can critically reappraise such experiences.

Perhaps a reappraisal in the sense of a mental "digestion" of these experiences is impossible, since the experiences always lie dormant in some corner of the psyche and can surface at any time.

The fact that Eugen Kogon frequently suffered from depressions as he grew older bears out this fact.

For more than three decades, however, the left-wing Catholic Kogon, who enjoyed discussions and debates, was a bundle of activity.

As a political sciences professor in Darmstadt he tried to gain the support of the technocratic intelligentsia for democracy.

As a man of the media — for example, as presenter of the TV political report programme *Panorama* — he fought against the restoration tendencies during the Adenauer era.

As a convinced European — as president of the European Union — he campaigned against nationalism.

And as a controversial, combative and political figure he refused to be instrumentalised by political groups, such as the Communists during their attempt to undermine the Association of the Victims of Persecution during Nazi Germany (VVN) or the advocates of the emergency laws.

Above all, he stimulated and advocated dialogue.

As a journalist he fulfilled one of the most important functions in his long life: as founder, co-editor and the source of inspiration for the now legendary *Frankfurter Hefte* series of journals.

Kogon and his friend and partner Walter Dirks were kindred spirits.


Kogon was a mentor of two generations of liberal and Christian intellectuals, who tried to bring their tutor and Dirks, two important Republicans, together with the workers' movement and turn the bourgeois into a citoyen.

The *Frankfurter Hefte* were a highly significant part of Kogon's lifework. Their influence was particularly great during the first two postwar decades.

It was only during the 1980s, with Kogon and Dirks both over eighty years old, that it became difficult to keep the journal going.

The editors joined forces with the *Neue Gesellschaft*, the theoretical jour-

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■ MEDICINE

Probing lung cancer: lots of statistics plus the implausible wine factor

Air pollution is not one of the main causes of lung cancer, according to a study. The main cause, apart from smoking, is above average contact with cancer-causing substances, say Ulrich Abel, of the German Cancer Research Centre in Heidelberg and Professor Jürgen Misfeld of the Institute of Mathematics at the University of Hanover.

The Berlin Environment Authority commissioned the study to see how much environmental factors contribute to the development of lung cancer

Statistics show that among people in less industrialised countries such as Senegal, even taking different age groups in account, only 1.1 men in a 100,000 get lung cancer. In Hamburg the figure is 64.4.

Figures are high throughout the industrialised world, but with variations even within countries.

Bavaria has 64.7 cases of lung cancer per 100,000, Hesse 73.4 and Berlin 103,2.

There are even differences between neighbouring rural districts and even between neighbouring urban suburbs.

The explanation for this is possibly differences in lifestyle and in the quantity and type of cigarettes smoked. But this is only part of the explanation. Many areas have the same life and smoking habits as others but still have higher cancer rates. Why?





The most likely explanation is contact with pollutants at work. But it is difficult to prove such theories. They require carefully planned experiments because these carcinogenic substances take effect over 15 to 20 years.

American research points to the job as a major source of the illness. Chefs, decorators or barmanagers have a very low risk of getting lung cancer. On the other hand asbestos workers or roofers and tilers have a five to eight times greater chance of becoming ill.

There are three main reasons why the work place can increase the cancer risk. First contact with polycyclical aromatic hydrocarbons - these are produced by incomplete combustion. Second, contact with asbestos and third doses of radioactive radiation.

Workers at coke ovens breathing in hydrocarbons are particularly in danger.

In their case the question of smoking is irrelevant.

Employees at ironworks, casting foundries, tar factories, asbestos works, as well as welders, burners and distillers are also at risk.

Tar processors, for example, have 3.5 times more chance of having cancer than the rest of the population.

The more meticulous Abel and Misfeld's meticulous study became the more it indicated the sources of the illness.

But at this stage they can only say what the risks are. They still cannot say what the exact mathematical effects of any substance will be.

It is clear however that members of groups at risk increase the risk of catching the illness through smoking.

The two specialists examined the air in cities and found that the concentrations of carcinogenic substances were clearly weaker than in work places. The works which they drew upon do not have any measurable evidence. According to these works air pollution does not contribute to the development of lung cancer.

Admittedly there is a certain difference between city and *Land*. But the slighty higher risk in cities could be explained by lifestyles or statistical mistakes.

Science is not in a position at present to explain these results.

Both scientists found only one indicator that living beside an air pollutant increased the risk of catching cancer. This was a tin works.

However it's difficult to examine factories and foundries. The connection should be taken seriously but it should be borne in mind the suspicious has not been proved.

Abel and Misfeld found out that statistics are often misleading. For example they have indications that wine consumption is connected to lung cancer. Because they could not explain the figures, they classified them as implausible.

Dieter Schwab

(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 7 January 1988)

Continued from page 12

nal of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation with its social-democratic leanings. The practician Kogon, who had often fought against the SPD (not only in the campaign against the emergency laws), did not contest the move.

Right up until the end of his life he remained true to the idea that Christianity and socialism must come together.

It was some time during the late 1970s that Eugen Kogon told the story of the death of the farmer Hiasl to a small circle of listeners following a discussion on new technologies.

For forty years the parish priest had preached about eternal life.

When he visited the farmer Hiasl to administer the last rites he found Hiasl laughing bitterly with his face to the wall.

"What's the matter, Hiasl?," the priest asked.

Hiasl answered (in a strong Bavarian dialect): *Lacha dat i, wanns ols net wahr war* (rough translation: I'm laughing cos' it's all a lie).

Those who heard Kogon tell this story remember clearly how well he imitated Hiasl's bitter laughter.

Peter Glotz

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 30 December 1987)

Date-of-birth link with schizophrenia

Scientists say they have found evidence linking date of birth and the chances of a person developing schizophrenia. They say the risk is higher for people born in the first half of the year.

Several reports about this link have appeared. Now, Professor Heinz Häfner and other scientists at the Mannheim Central Institute for Mental Health are able to add their evidence.

The scientists compared birthdays of healthy people with people who have had the illness at some time in their lives.

Their findings, published in the *European Archives of Psychiatry and Neurological Sciences*, showed that the number of schizophrenics born in March, April and May was 10 per cent higher that the annual average. The number born in June, July and August was 10 per cent below this average.

The researchers have two entirely different possible explanations: one is that foetuses and babies are affected by something which becomes active at certain times of the year; the other is known as the procreational behaviourial theory.

One possible factor in the first theory is lack of vitamins caused by seasonal changes. Another is the weather itself. A third is the effects of infectious diseases.

But scientists still do not know which seasonal factors at a given stage of development can damage the nervous system.

Modern methods of research have been able to uncover certain changes in the brain among schizophrenics. But this has not been of much help in coming up with definite answers.

Many schizophrenics' brains do not show any changes whereas many healthy people's do. So it is difficult for scientists to know how to interpret such findings. So the Mannheim researchers are taking the second hypothesis more seriously — the procreational behaviourial theory.

It is quite possible that some of the fathers and mothers of schizophrenic patients are inhibited about having sex. When the summer comes they are more likely to be able to overcome their inhibitions.

Evidence for this is the fact that more people are born in spring than the annual average. But also that the share of mentally handicapped children born in May and April is also above average.

The amount of depressed emotionally disturbed people with birthdays at this time is quite high.

It's also quite possible that the parents of schizophrenics have a psyhosocial deficit in common, which is reflected in the seasonal context.

If this assumption is correct, it would mean that the brothers and sisters of sufferers are often born early in the year. However the scientists admit this is not confirmed by the available data.

Though it might be the case that schizophrenics have in general fewer brothers and sisters than other people.

Researchers are also working on the connection between only children and the disease.

A more comprehensive analysis of birthdays connections should throw more light on whether the second thesis is correct.

Rolf Degen

(General-Anzeiger Bonn, 16 January 1988)

■ HORIZONS

No shortage of applicants to go to school to learn to be secret agents

The *Verfassungsschutz* is the Federal agency which handles counter-espionage work in this country. Each *Land* also has a branch.

The agency has a training school near Bonn and, although everybody knows where it is, you won't find its address in print anywhere.

Seen from outside, it could be a school run by trade unions or just as easily, a school run by employers to train managers.

There is a tennis court and a volleyball court, inconspicuous U-form architecture, large slate roofs, tough, functional furniture, 86 accommodation rooms, a bowling alley in the basement. If it weren't for the huge iron-piling fence and an unsightly observation block, the area would be idyllic.

The building was built in 1955. It has all the equipment of a modern teaching institution: film projectors, television monitors, blackboards and video cameras.

At midday, an urn of pea stew was brought to the canteen so that teachers and pupils could continue their work uninterrupted.

It is is a school like no other. The employees here who pass on their intellectual and artisanal skills are not supposed to be just like other civil servants, according to the job specifications. They must be high-minded, helpful and competent. They must develop a job image that goes far beyond what is formally demanded.

This includes maintaining a certain reserve of nature, making sure the mouth is kept firmly closed, fulfilling the obligation of being constantly available for duty, and supplying creativity from a never-ending source.

So what sort of 18- to 20 year olds go to the school to try and make a career out of activities regarded by a large part of society as snooping, prying and acting like stool pigeons (such terms were actually used in a brochure the authority put out itself in 1984 with the aim of justifying its work.)

There are 2,200 employees in the Federal branch. These, in contrast to the *Land* branches, have formal training periods varying between two and three years. Here, says Lange, there is no shortage of recruits.

Between 1,500 and 2,000 applications are received every year, for example, for about 20 training vacancies leading to senior positions.


A spokesman says it is not even necessary to advertise. But it used to be different in the 1970s when there were plenty of positions free and difficult to fill with people with the right qualifications.

The head of the school is Peter Simmt. The Press spokesman for the *Verfassungsschutz* office in Cologne is Hans-Gert Lange.

About 500 or 600 are short-listed from the applicants and are put through aptitude tests. At a later stage when security tests have to be applied, those from "extreme situations" are weeded out. Accepted candidates, Semmt says, come "from the bourgeois centre".

They are not asked if they belong to a political party but they regard themselves as being interested in politics in a general way.

So, are the accepted applicants a cross-section of society or frustrated James Bonds? Semmt says: "Not James



Bonds. We don't want them. We can't use the over motivated."

Participants are first threatened with "the blue wonder." That is the name given *to a volume of loose sheets between* two sides of dark-blue plastic covers. The sheets contain laws, ordinances, regulations, proclamations, service instructions and other paraphernalia.

If it is the sheer size of these regulations that is to blame for the fact that the history of the *Verfassungschutz* has been dotted with scandals is a question neither Semmt nor Lange are understandably keen to answer publicly.

But they do answer — carefully. "We try to work according to the existing guidelines but sometimes, we use our discretion to use them to their limits." Sometimes mistakes were made, or it emerged with hindsight that the best course of action had not been taken.

Semmt says that some errors are particularly to be avoided because they breach individual's constitutional rights. It was different when the police or the legal system made mistakes because there was a system of compensation.

But *when the Verfassungsschutz* erred, a political element was inevitably dragged into the resultant criticism of the organisation.

Especially with counter-espionage. But much more controversial are fields of activity that in the jargon of the school come under the categories of right-wing, left-wing and aliens' extremism. (Other areas of activity are "law and administration", "defence against terrorism," and "espionage methods, tactics and techniques.")

A heavy critic of the authority such as the Greens member of the Bundestag, Hans-Christian Ströbele made a pithy point when he was a member of the parliamentary committee investigating the Tiedge affair (in reference to Hansjoachim Tiedge, a department head of *Verfassungsschutz* who in 1985 defected to East Germany. There were reports at the time that Tiedge was known to have owed money and to have been an alcoholic but had been allowed to stay in his job.)

Ströbele said simply: "This secret service is beyond rescue." In the early day of the organisation, according to Ströbele, it specialised in setting the anti-communist line of the government. But in the 1960s and 1970s, he said, "a bigger part of the extra-parliamentary opposition came under the scrutiny of both federal and *Land Verfassungsschutz*." And since then, nothing had changed.

Ströbele feels that he has been called to investigate the investigators. Naturally, his view of things is not shared by Semmt, who sees the so-called KPD decision (KPD is the West German communist party) of the Federal Constitutional Court as sufficient legal justification for the activities of the *Verfassungsschutz*.

Hans Josef Horchem is a former head of the Hamburg *Verfassungsschutz* who now is employed by the Springer publishing organisation. He wrote in 1981 that the agency's recruiting policies were bad.

"They couldn't even hire second best," he wrote. "Can you imagine a sailor volunteering to join the navy to go to sea in a rust bucket?"

Semmt disputes this view. He says that the number of applications itself contradicts Horchem. And the work of the school itself considerably improved trainees' capabilities.

Semmt also disputes Horchem's view that the only reason people apply to be taken on by such an unloved organisa*tion is job security* and pay.

A difficult problem was naturally that many employees were not able to tell friends and acquaintances what they did for a living.

On the other hand, says Lange, there had been many changes since the 1950s, when a mood of conspiracy prevailed. He said employees were now able to say where they worked, even if they weren't required to spell it out. The Bonn Interior Ministry was enough.

Psychological care for employees had been stepped up since the shock of the Tiedge affair, says Lange. A course on how stress could be overcome was available. In the Federal branch there was now a house psychologist.

One of the aims is to recognise if employees have debts, if they are excessively talkative and have an excessive lifestyle — and if they are likely blackmail candidates.

One of the things an employee cannot do throughout his or her lifetime is visit the East Bloc. Whereas East Bloc spies tried in West Germany can sometimes expect long jail sentences, anyone tried in East Germany for "activities in the service of the imperialists" can always expect life without remission.

Because counter-espionage belongs to one of the most highly rated activities of the organisation, which means that employees should have a good knowledge of the way their opponents are thinking, subjects like Marxism are high on the school's agenda.

The library has 5,000 books but many basic political science works are not included. Neither are many important law books, background novels and philosophic volumes.

Training in photography is extensive. Pupils learn on diverse cameras, they learn to use radios and learn how to transmit from vehicles without being caught.

Video is coming to play a bigger and bigger role. They learn, when acting as a control agent, how to pump their man for information. They practice in the cellar of the school building, where there are three rooms, a living room, a bar and an office.

And they do it over and over again in front of a video camera. Non-command talking techniques as well as "psychological body language" are practised. This latter art is useful, according to the school, in the initial phases, because it can lead to the contact revealing inner thoughts. Training helps the agent to "appear more confident and elegant", says Semmt.

Will the school manage to overcome the secret-service mentality which finds its expression in attitudes of esprit de corps and elitism, as Hans-Joachim Schwagerl, for many years a senior agency official, once wrote about it?

Günther Scheicher, chief of the Hesse *Land Verfassungsschutz, says* the school is managing well to instil the principles of law into trainees. The agency had come round to realising that public criticism had to be faced and agents in the field were becoming self-critical.

The kind of mentality that led French agents to blow up the Greenpeace vessel in New Zealand was not wanted.

Scheicher said that the act in Celle where *Verfassungsschutz* agents exploded a hole in a prison wall was an aberration.

Shortly after the school was opened in 1955, the eavesdrop-proof telephone boxes were rebuilt with little slits for air because the pupils were staggering out gasping for breath after making calls. For Semmt, that was symbolic. You can suffocate with too much security, he says. But you can't breathe easily with none at all.

Hans-Helmut Kolb

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 8 January 1988)

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permanent exhibition that has now been completed.

The complexity of the connections are not veiled for the sake of simplification, but unfolded as a matter of course.

The expression "Dream factory" seems to take on meaning here, the dreams of generations and the methods of industrial production are placed closely besides one another, without breaking the magic of the illusion.

On the contrary, a walk through the museum quickly shows how closely reality and illusion are dovetailed with one another, how quickly they have to react on one another so that the cinema can perform its function.

The reality includes the concept that "art is money" and major film producers were shareholders; Marilyn Monroe's dress blown up by a draft of air from the underground or Godzilla's revenge are only illusion.

The cartoon is a particularly attractive aspect of the film; astonishing explanatory material shows the command the technician has over illusion.

If you consider that the average film-goer today knows all about filming tricks, all about Eugene Shuftan's enlargement process and backward and forward projection, it is then astonishing with what finesse variations on the first cartoons are worked out for new productions aided, of course, by the latest in electronics.

The most simple landscape does not have to be a real landscape. The idyllic fishing village that Hitchcock used for *The Birds* only existed as a whole as a painting. To create totality shots of seascapes were combined with the painting.

The visitor can even participate in this sector of filming through explanatory illustrative material, captions and three-dimensional models.


The visitor can go on the command bridge of a space-ship and race off through space.

The section dealing with genre films has many captions to read and an abundance of photographs, elucidating the development of single examples of narration and classic film topics.

Here the age-old traditions are obvious, in which the young medium is immersed.

Film types such as the western, the horror film, the adventure film, even the gangster and science-fiction film, refer to plots that existed in epochs when stories were not written down but handed down by word of mouth.

(Allgemeine Zeitung Mainz, 5 January 1988)



■ LIFE

Museum runs see-by-touch exhibition for the blind

He must be able to fly with such big ears, was the first astonished reaction, not of a child brought up on picture-book stories of Jumbo who sees an elephant for the first time, but a grown man.

Helmut is blind and in the Alexander Koenig Natural History Museum in Bonn he has had the oppotunity to get to know such a large animal by touch.

The other men and woman in his *group* are delighted. Almost with tenderness they run their hands over the back of an hippopotamus, trying to get to know the whole animal. Their hands linger around the large animal's head, going back over and over again to his eyes, ears and mouth.

The Koenig Natural History Museum was the venue of the Parliamentary Council after the war and can so be regarded as the Federal Republic's "birthplace."

The Museum did not find it easy to select the exhibits available to the blind people. It was important that they should be interesting animals, animals that blind people knew about and animals that were very distinct from one another.

There was no point in putting a zebra next to a horse. A blind person would need to be a zoologist to know the difference between the two.

The exhibition, housed on the first floor in a separate room, includes more than 20 exhibits. That is not many but their attraction is increased by animals *that*, for various reasons, are no longer of use to the museum's researchers.

It is, however, uncertain whether Helmut's special request could ever be met — he would like to run his hands over a shark just once.

"Museum educationalist" Klaus-Rainer Hasenkampf is responsible for having set up this exhibition. When he took up his appointment in the museum eight years ago he was frequently asked by blind people if they could touch the large animals in the display rooms.

In certain cases he was able to allow this, but in the long term the museum's curators objected on the grounds that the animals' fur would be damaged by too much handling. Furthermore blind people would come into contact with the chemicals used to preserve the animals and keep off insects.

It was not easy for biologist Hasenkamp to get hold of 20 odd animals that "could be touched," and squeeze out of the museum's collection small creatures such as owls, rattle-snakes, meadow pipits and rats, Helmut's favourite animals.

"What is the difference between an elephant and a rhinoceros?" It is difficult for blind people to get a whole idea of an animal from individual details. Clearly defined details such as feet or teeth are of particular interest to them.

Once or twice a blind person has mixed up a rhino's horn with his mouth.

People who can see can keep in their memory an impression of the whole animal, for instance, the size and massiveness of an elephant. Helmut, however, has to stand on tiptoe and feel to the top of the animal with his stick to get some idea of the elephant's height. Blind people understand individual details easier and they are stamped on their memory.

Hardly any visitor to the museum who can see would have such a precise idea of an elephant's mouth as a blind person, who gives a lot of time and concentration to this part of the animal. The blind person gets to know that it is something more than an unknown crevice, "somewhere behind the trunk."

Parts of the animal that can be easily touched such as this are of considerable interest to blind people. Possibly they get quite a different idea of the animal from a person who can see, but nevertheless a real idea.

Klaus, who was blinded in an accident when he was a young man, has no difficulties understanding the large animals. He knows them from the time when he could see. His memory of them is brushed up and extended by the new experience of touching the exhibits.

The student girl with him, Barbara, who was born blind, has a lot more trouble comprehending the animals. The animal has to be small, touchable and she must be able to clasp it for her to comprehend it, creatures such as a goat or a lark. Those are creatures that Barbara can recognise easiest.

Soon she can get an idea of what a hedgehog is like. Herr Hasenkamp has only to get a description transposed into braille then the hedgehog can be included in the exhibition.

He has had to follow his own instincts in his work. There is no standard training for "museum educationalist." Projects to introduce special student courses, such as at Essen University, have come up against two difficulties: there are few posts open for "museum educationalists" *and then there are differences in the* work they are expected to do. Only occasionally is it possible to arrange for an exchange of experience with colleagues in other establishments.

This situation is improving. The Bonn exhibition has stimulated interest in permanent exhibitions for blind people.

Klaus-Rainer Hasenkamp has been invited to talk about his ideas in Paris and Krefeld and the open-air museum in Kommern, west of Bonn, has had a sheep prepared by the Koenig Natural History Museum.

Blind people and associations for the blind have for a long time requested that the blind should be able to touch animals, particularly domestic animals. There are more and more opportunities to do so all the time.

The job designation "museum educationalist" first appeared in Germany in 1934, although a beginning in this direction was first made in the Senckenberg Museum in 1926.

For some years the German Museums Association has been considering the question of training and aims for its educationalists, for there are already about a dozen people working in the Federal Republic.

A Museums Association spokesman would only say, however, that museum educationalist "liasied" between visitors and the museum exhibits.

But there should be something more than just "liaison" between the visitor and the objects on display. The visitor should be able to understand the objects in their context, something about evolution and the individual exhibits.

The museum educationalist should be able to pass on general information about practical experience with the exhibits, creating a greater awareness and extending knowledge.

Is this approach possible with blind people who have just got to know something in a museum that was obvious to people who can see?

An "ordinary" visitor knows a rhino from films or documentary films or from personal experience, for instance a visit to a zoo. He knows how the animal moves, how it behaves and how it lives because he has seen one.

Most blind people have heard about such an animal, on a cassette or on the radio, or they have read about it in a braille book. But they only get a real idea of the animal when they come into contact with it. Barbara admits that "getting to know an animal is the most important thing for me, but for me it is also the starting point of more knowledge."



Getting the feel of a rhino.

(Photo: Hans-Günther Oed)

She proceeded systematically, beginning with the front legs of the hippopotamus. She then touched the huge animal all over. Only when she had a general idea of the animal did she examine clearly defined parts of the animal's body in detail.

She found this method easy in the museum's exhibition. The animals made no objection, of course. She believes that she can now better understand animal and human reactions. Connections were clear to her.

She said: "I was always surprised that people in adventure films had so much respect for the vegetarian hippopotamus."

She had not imagined that the animal's horn was so long and so pointed. She was also surprised that the hippo was so enormous.

Blind people's expectations from a museum visit are different from those who can see, for various objects are a closed book to them.

Klaus spoke of a visit to an art museum where he had touched a statue. He said that it was wonderful to feel the statue's form even if he was not capable of seeing and fathoming out what the artist was trying to express.

His imagination is stronger than that of a person who can see. He has a sense of achievement if he can "touch objects that are otherwise concealed from me."

This encourages his feeling that he is not entirely shut out from cultural life. He has acquired a small piece of reality.

Looking after blind people in groups is generally a difficult matter. With people who can see it is sufficient to give an explanation of an object once.

But with blind people in a group every person has to have the opportunity of getting to know the exhibits with their hands. This is time-consuming for the visitors and enervating for educationalists.

Klaus-Rainer Hasenkamp said: "For this reason we have made it possible for blind people to visit the museum as individuals and not in groups."

The permanent exhibition is very definitely open for individual visits. Blind people can get the key to the exhibition room at the museum's entrance and visit it in their own time and according to their personal interests.

This idea has been of value to both sides. The number of blind people who have visited the Alexander Koenig Natural History Museum has more than doubled. Barbara wants to return, alone, as does Helmut who likes rats so much.

Hermann Diel

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, Bonn, 15 January 1988)

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that only the SED has the right to interpret communist literature. And all the more so when people who think differently in the GDR refer to Rosa Luxemburg's comment on freedom of thought.

The case of the demonstrators is more complicated for the SED than it at first looks. Among those who took part were people who want to leave socialism for good. And they have always been a particular thorn in the flesh of the communists.

The political tone of the ageing communist heads at the commemoration was a clear rejection of the younger Soviet leader's *glasnost*.

The East German leadership is afraid of losing its monopoly of opinion and power. Therefore, to hold on to them, it is resorting to the traditional methods of arrest, intimidation and the handicapping of Western journalists.

The SED had enough unpleasant experiences last year on Whit Sunday with citizens who think differently. Many young people gathered at the Berlin Wall near the Brandenburg Gate to hear a pop concert which was taking place in the West.

Scuffles broke out between the police and young people who chanted Gorbachov's name and called for the right to be able to go to the concert.

This year has not been much better. The communist authorities aroused indignation in the West when they searched the Zionskirche in East Berlin for human rights activists.

It would appear that the SED has learnt nothing from its mistakes of the past year.

Karl-Heinz Baum

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 19 January 1988)